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Martin Kramer

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Martin Kramer
Foreword by Robert G. Neumann

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FOREWORD

The fate of Islam has been that its importance has consistently been under- or overestimated by the Western world. When Islam is overestimated, as it was in the wake of the revolution in Iran, it is perceived in a distorted fashion. Thus, many commentators, who have previously treated Islam with benign neglect, now, almost hysterically, regard it as a single, irresistable force, liable to sweep 800 million Muslims right back into the Middle Ages.

The truth, as Martin Kramer's excellent and compact study shows, is a good deal more complex and less alarming. For instance, Iranian Shi'ism—a fundamentalist Shi'ism as well—is not the rule but the exception in the Muslim world. Sunni fundamentalism, as practiced by the Wahabi sect of Saudi Arabia, is an integral part of the ruling family, not its opponent. Yet another form of Islamic and Sunni fundamentalism, the Muslim Brotherhood, is only one of several opposition groups in Turkey and Egypt, in contrast to the single platform on which opposition to the Shah manifested itself in Iran.

Different again is the Islamic fundamentalism in General Zia ul-Huq's Pakistan, or in Afghanistan, where it is one among several powerful forces stirring rebellion against the communist dictatorship of Hafizullah Amin. Still more different is the Islamic fundamentalism of Colonel Qadhafi's Libya.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), while appealing to Muslim solidarity and underlining its claim for the restoration of Arab (Muslim) control of the holy places in Jerusalem, is nevertheless a secular, *not* primarily a religious, movement. It counts many Christians among its members and followers.

One must never overlook the fact that, from its very foundation, Islam has always been a political religion. Islamic law and doctrine apply to all actions both of individuals and communities. Political Islam has directed its energies, since the nineteenth century, particularly against the inroads of colonialism and in general against all inroads of the Western world that are considered as denigrating Islam.

Finally, one should also be aware that when social tensions create a revolutionary situation in Muslim countries, the subsequent outbreak may bear an Islamic label—even when the causes of the upheaval have little to do with religion.

In view of recent events, especially in Iran, it is high time that Islam receive the attention that has so long been withheld by scholars and journalists who persist in viewing the world in strictly Western terms. By the same token, Islam must be viewed in the context of the many different societies that embrace it, and not as a single phenomenon, even though it rises from a common base.

Kramer's merit is that he has, with considerable learning and discrimination, given a balanced and dispassionate analysis of the political aspects of Islam that are part of the realities of our times. His work merits the attention of all those who are trying to understand some of our most vexing problems, without forcing them all into an East-West or North-South frame of reference.

—Robert G. Neumann
Coordinator of Middle East Programs
Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Morocco
November, 1979

PREFACE

Nearly 60 years have passed since the publication of Lothrop Stoddard's *The New World of Islam* (New York, 1921), a descriptive commentary on the Muslim *Zeitgeist* of an earlier era which is now rarely read and almost never cited. Stoddard was a Harvard-educated American preoccupied with eugenics and assorted racial theories, best known to his contemporaries for an earlier volume unhappily entitled *The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy*. This freelance analyst, however, also counted Muslim current affairs among his literary hobbies at a time when few Americans could or did write persuasively about the subject, and so *The New World of Islam* was rather an unusual piece. The book enjoyed a short-lived popularity, was republished in London, later appeared in French translation and saw two expanded Arabic editions. Recent reprints can still be purchased in Cairo.

Stoddard's work in particular deserves mention for the enduring topicality of its chapter heads. The first was titled "The Mohammedan Revival"; the second, "Pan-Islamism"; another surveyed Islam and the West, while the last dealt with "Social Unrest and Bolshevism". The present upheaval in Iran has suddenly restored each of these issues to the very forefront of current concerns: the Islamic "revival," the politics of Muslim solidarity, and the relationships between

Muslim movements and outside powers are again infused with immediacy. Today Americans find themselves a captive audience, and their quest for insights has become a compulsion.

Unlike the questions he posed, Stoddard's insights proved ephemeral; his book slid into obscurity and his reputation evaporated. He was chided by the Italian orientalist Giorgio Levi della Vida (in his *Storia et Religione nell'Oriente Semitico*) for his "insufficient knowledge of the past history and theological-political doctrine of Islam, a knowledge indispensable to making sense of contemporary phenomena which, although they assume a modern guise, are nothing but a continuation of that history and a development of that doctrine." The idea of historical continuity in Islam is no longer much in vogue; ours is a period of rapid change and ideological ferment. In this paper the concern is with those for whom the quest for continuity between Muslim past and Muslim present is a political program; their moves are fairly unintelligible without gentle doses of history and doctrine. These have been kept to a minimum here, but they have been kept all the same.

I must acknowledge two debts of the sort that cannot be repaid. The first I owe to Professor Bernard Lewis of Princeton University and the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, who encouraged this study. I know no finer teacher or friend. The second is due Professor Hedley Bull and the members of the British Committee for the Theory of International Politics. They were kind enough to host me at their sessions on Islam's role in contemporary international affairs, conducted at All Souls College, Oxford, in April 1979. I benefitted immensely from that exchange; I bear, however, sole responsibility for the conclusions presented here.

Martin Kramer
Cairo, August 1979

SOURCES

References in this work, followed by the appropriate dates, are as follows:

British Broadcast Corporation World Summary of Broadcasts for the Middle East (BBC/ME)
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Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)
International Herald Tribune (IHT)
New York Times (NYT)
The Guardian (Manchester, London)
Le Monde (Paris)
Arab Report and Record (ARR)
Time (Overseas Edition)
Al-Ahram (Cairo)
Ruz al-Yusuf (Cairo)
Al-Ukaz (Saudi Arabia)
Al-Bilad (Saudi Arabia)
Dawn Overseas (Pakistan)

In addition, there are extensive citations from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khumayni's work "al-Hukuma al-Islamiyya"– (Beirut edition).

INTRODUCTION

Islampolitik

The lands inhabited today by Muslims are vast and far-flung; their geographic breadth evidences the tremendous expansive force of Islam. Muslims now number close to 700 million, form the bulk of the populations of some 40 nations, and live elsewhere as large and sometimes influential minorities. Yet, these peoples and territories, so utterly disparate, are bound by the shared affinity of a universal creed. Muslim jurists designated their own dominions the *dar al-islam* or *bilad al-islam*—the sovereign abode of Islam, unified by one faith and a single mission. Within this world of Muslim primacy, classical Islamic political theory recognized no borders or frontiers; "as people go from one quarter of the town to the other," so Muslims passed from country to country within their spacious commonwealth. Practice often fell short of ideal, but the law was clear and has survived into this century. Wrote the poet-philosopher Iqbal:

> The law of Islam does not recognize the apparent differences of race, nor the historical differences of nationality. The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. . . . The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not

> in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or in the psychological fact of 'like-mindedness.'

Is like-mindedness of political significance? To an earlier generation, the answer was decidedly yes. As the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw once-great Muslim powers reel from the assaults of an expanding West, Muslims from the Ottoman Empire, Africa, Central Asia, and the East Indies sought to join hands in a desperate effort to forge cultural affinity into some semblance of political unity. Islam, proclaimed the pan-Islamists, was not only a world civilization but a world force, an ideology of political solidarity and resistance. An illustrative Ottoman appeal known as the *Ghalibnameh* and circulated in British India, lamented that,

> the enemies of Islam, the Russians, English, and French, have attacked the Ottoman dominions by land and sea. . . . the Muslims of Asia, Europe and Africa have equipped themselves with all kinds of arms and have rushed to join the *jihad* in the path of Allah. . . . Muslims! Attack the tyrannical Christian government under whose bondage you are living. . . . Hasten to put all your efforts with strong determination to strangle the enemy to death and show your hatred and enmity for them.

European powers responded with specifically Islamic policies designed to counter or exploit the 'menace' of this universal appeal. "The Netherlands cannot do without an Islamic policy," asserted the famed Dutch orientalist Snouck Hurgronje in his *Nederland en de Islam* (Leiden, 1911); the lines of these policies, in their many European variations, were sketched by the Bonn orientalist C.H. Becker in his period piece, *Islampolitik* (1915). The French government bowed to necessity through a 1911 decree that instituted "une commission interministérielle chargée dé determiner les modalités de notre politique musulmane et de rechecher la

solution des affaires communes aux différents departments intéressés en ce qui concerne les questions musulmanes," and the British government at one juncture in 1915 thought to create an Islamic Bureau "to coordinate our Islamic and Arabian intelligence." Islam was thought to be the common denominator of a cohesive global community, and so a "politique musulmane vraiment réalisatrice," in the words of the French savant Louis Massignon, was indispensable to any European colonial or foreign ministry.

At some point in the 1920s, however, the Islamic world ceased to impress political observers. World War I did much to dispel the vision of Islam as a force for the liberation of the Muslim East. The Entente powers had first been warned that the Ottomans would unleash a great jihad upon them: "The entire Islamic world is, so to say, connected by an electric wire," wrote the Indian pan-Islamist and scholar, Abu'l-Kalam Azad. "The hand of the great Sultan of Turkey rests on its button. The least pressure on the button can disturb the whole Islamic world." But when that button was finally and repeatedly pushed in 1914, the Muslim masses of India and Central Asia, Egypt and North Africa, lay passive. Even more stunning was the so-called Arab Revolt, the wartime uprising of Arab Muslims, long under Ottoman rule, against their Turkish Muslim brethren. By this act, Arab Muslims—the first among Muslim peoples—had actively plotted with the English foreigner to dismember the last great Muslim polity, the Ottoman state. Pan-Islam was a spent force, a bogey, even a hoax: Muslim peoples had turned inward, finding comfort in narrow nationalisms such as Arabism and Turkism, and discarding the outworn ideology of Muslim solidarity. "It is rather doubtful how far pan-Islamism, as distinct from Pan-Arabianism, is even theoretically significant today," wrote Britain's High Commissioner to Egypt in 1931. A British Foreign Office minute of 1928

arrived at the same verdict: "All our information goes to show that the present tendency in Moslem countries is towards mere nationalism, usually with an anti-European complexion, and that, apart from this political ferment, there is no real Islamic revival."

The revolution in Iran has brought moribund Islam back to political center-stage after a lengthy absence. The coup was the work of self-proclaimed Islamic revolutionaries, was inspired by a devout *mullah*, and culminated in the creation of an Islamic republic. "The revolution is Islamic," proclaimed Ibrahim Yazdi, intimate of Ayatullah Khumayni and former foreign minister. "Anyone who thinks otherwise is in serious error." Few now entertain doubts on this score, least of all the Muslims beyond the borders of Iran who acclaimed the revolution's ideals as their own.

For other Muslims, Iran's revolution was but a foretoken of an Islamic movement of much wider dimensions. They and their Iranian champions claim a restored unity of mind and identity of purpose for Islam. For Ayatullah Khumayni, Iran's Islamic revolution was not merely an event but a portent:

> I hope that all Islamic nations, which have been set against one another and divided by the evil foreign propaganda against them, will wake up and join hands to form a great Islamic government under the banner of 'There is no God but Allah' and prove victorious the whole world over (BBC/ME, February 27, 1979).

Yazdi, too, sees in Iran an omen:

> I think a new era of Islamic struggle and a new Islamic awareness have been triggered by our revolution. From now on, all Islamic movements that were dormant or apologetic in their approach to change or action will come out in the open in the Muslim world (Time, April 16, 1979).

For the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, the cards have just started to tumble:

> The path we have chosen is identical; we are moving forward on the same path; we are fighting the same struggle, the same revolution; our nation is one. . . . We have always lived in the same trenches, for the same goal and the same slogan. Our slogan is: We are all Muslims; we are all Islamic revolutionaries, all fighting for the establishment of one body of Islamic believers. We shall continue our struggle against Zionism and move towards Palestine alongside the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries (BBC/ME, February 21, 1979).

"Not only in Iran has religion emerged unexpectedly to thwart America's plan for stabilizing the region," concludes *Al-Ahram* political commentator Muhammad Sid-Ahmad; and official Washington's own post-Iran reassessments went rather far in viewing Iran's revolution as the tip of an Islamic iceberg. President Carter's national security adviser ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to produce a worldwide study of Muslim movements, a step taken in direct response to criticism leveled at those agencies for following old precedent and discounting the Islamic movement in Iran. Muslim politics in Turkey and Egypt were said to be of sudden concern to the administration, and several officials were now drawn to the Muslim facet of the Palestinian movement. "The Moslem claim to East or Old Jerusalem has a religious derivation," one official was quoted as saying. "Any fool can see the lethal potential in the aftermath of Iran" (IHT, February 17-18, 1979). The message here was that events in Iran were now liable to repetition among Muslims elsewhere or anywhere, probably to the detriment of the United States, and that some sort of response was a necessity.

These comments look to be the first steps toward an American *Islampolitik*. They emerge from the revived assumption that Islam is an entity of political portent with transnational implications—an assumption that represents no less than a radical rejection of five decades of accumulated

doctrine. In a remarkably brief span of time, Islam has been elevated from a negligible coincidence of human geography, to a political force of global import. So rapid a reappraisal begs an exacting trial. Whether this Islamic "revival" represents a single movement, whether it is widespread, whether it has the potential to alter the direction of politics in wide parts of Asia and Africa—these are the outstanding questions to which this essay is addressed.

I. GENESIS

Few wars are not remembered as turning points. One might imagine that in the Middle East, where war has followed war in a monotonous rhythm of violence, the experience might well have been cheapened. The rise of a new Muslim awareness, however, is commonly credited to the Arab-Israeli wars of June 1967, and of October 1973. The prior defeat and the later success, generated a Muslim resurgence, and we are now said to be living with the cumulative legacy of both.

This version rests first on the well-known Arab crisis of conscience that followed the June 1967 defeat. "Every war is fought twice," writes Michael Walzer, "first, militarily and then, especially among the losers, politically and intellectually." From the vantage point of the losers, 1967 represented the most decisive and humbling of the defeats inflicted by Israel. Loss of Arab self-esteem was nearly complete; the sense of shame overwhelming. However, the other side of the collective depression that consumed the Arabs was a readiness for some critical introspection. The defeat was dissected and the war refought in scores of Arabic books and articles. Very few earned a wide readership, and uncritical or conspiratorial interpretations still flourished. From the works of self-scrutiny there did emerge several broad approaches to the utter collapse of Arab arms, and each gained a following.

One "school" held that the war revealed "traditional" Arab-Muslim society, with its premium on custom and religion, to be wholly bankrupt and incapable of sustaining military or any other kind of progress. Nothing short of uncompromising socioeconomic modernization could avert the same sort of shameful debacle in the round to come. The most scathing of the works in this vein was Sadiq al-Azm's *al-Naqd al-dhati ba'd al-hazima* (Self-Criticism after the Defeat), authored by an avowed antagonist of religion who had been tried for confessional agitation by a Lebanese court for an earlier work of brutal rationalism, *Naqd al-fikr al-dini* (A Critique of Religious Thought).

It is to a second interpretation of the 1967 defeat that a heightened Muslim awareness is said to owe its ascent. Despair and spiritual faith are bound together in a web of relationships difficult to untangle. The magnitude of the defeat was so overwhelming that some Muslims clearly preferred to interpret the disaster as a form of divine retribution and a test of faith. The rector of Cairo's theological university, the Azhar, provided a resumé of this credo at a Muslim conference in 1968:

> The catastrophe of the setback that had befallen the Arab nation and Islamic peoples was not more of a political ordeal than a religious trial. It is quite possible for the policies of human beings to get involved in misapprehension or to be at fault in planning and the measures they take in encountering the enemy. But it is inconceivable that God would grant to the Unbelievers a way to triumph over the Believers. [Unless the believers had neglected faith and observance, abandoned their trust, and tested God's patience.] For this reason, the setback that had befallen us, is nothing but a sign of God's solicitude for our welfare, since we have, certainly, the genuine sentiment of religion, even if we have missed the ways of the pious.

God's inscrutable ways were pondered in numerous publications; Salah al-Din al-Munajjid's *A'midat al-nakba* (Pillars of the Disaster) was perhaps the most celebrated.

Those mindful of God's signs then rededicated themselves to collective religious devotions and the pursuit of penitential piety. It is hardly possible to gauge the diffusion of these kinds of beliefs, but when the next war was waged—in October 1973—the religious idiom emerged much more distinctly than at any moment during the previous quarter-century of Arab-Israeli conflict. The rector of the Azhar preached to his congregation on the first Friday after the opening of hostilities that this time the Arabs were waging "an Islamic war in every sense of the word" and a "holy jihad." The same electrifying theme ran through so much of the press and broadcast media, and spawned so many accounts of miraculous visions and events on the battlefront, that it would not be presumptuous to say that the October war was waged as an Islamic war for untold multitudes. For those believers who saw 1967 as an act of divine retribution, the military success of 1973 and the economic triumphs of the subsequent oil embargo were acts of divine providence. Their earlier analysis was confirmed now that their heightened religious fervor had yielded manifest results. "It is by force of our attachment to our religion and our faith that we won," Saudi Arabia's late King Faysal reminded front-line troops during a 1975 visit to Syria. "In launching the attack, you invoked God, who promised victory to the Muslims and to the Arabs."

Here, it is said, are the origins of the current mood; and for some Muslims, these events undoubtedly do represent stations on their road to Muslim consciousness. Here, however, lies too obvious a paradox: The most dramatic Muslim awakenings occurred not in the Arab states bordering Israel, but in Iran and Afghanistan. These Islamic uprisings were the work of Muslims untouched by the military consequences of either war, and removed from Arab agonies of critical introspection and subsequent religious exhilaration. Muslims beyond the Arab world, as we shall see, are by no means in a position *au dessus de la melée* toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and we

will return to the question of whether the Muslim solar system revolves around Arab Islam. Yet students of revolution would agree that events of revolutionary magnitude cannot be attributed to vicarious experience. To trace the profound turmoil that ended almost 60 years of Pahlevi rule in Iran back to Arab-Israeli wars is to follow a contrived geneology; the Afghan jihad is even more remote.

There is, however, a greater shared experience. The past two centuries have seen Muslim peoples thoroughly transformed; today men no longer live the lives of their fathers. It is as though history were suddenly accelerated; the human and physical landscape rolls by with an unprecedented rapidity. The pressing need to innovate has overtaken the urge to conserve.

This revolution was not spontaneous. For the locomotive of change was the West—the source of what the late Marshall Hodgson called "technicalism," where innovation serves the idea of limitless progress, where modernity has shattered the conventional pattern of history. A small fraction of mankind laid the foundations for a global civilization rooted in concepts that first emerged from a corner of Europe. Lamenting Westerners will profess displeasure with the world they wrought, but their second thoughts provide no consolation to others. Muslims, and indeed all non-Western peoples, must respond to the fact of the West, a force (until now) beyond their reach that has altered their lives in a profound and perhaps irreversible way.

Few non-Western peoples can live at ease with the West's seizure of modern history. Today's Muslims are heirs to a civilization that set the standards for an earlier age, a civilization carried by empires that brimmed with self-assurance and élan. Muslim polities easily maintained a military parity with the medieval and Renaissance West and launched several offensives that might well have tipped the balance decisively in favor of Islam. Of their moral and intellectual superiority

Muslims were never in doubt. Their community was a collectivity preferred by God, governed by His immutable law as revealed through Muhammad, seal of the prophets, and through the holy Quran, a work of evident perfection. The community of Islam founded by Muhammad and his successors lived by an ethic that could never be improved, that established perfected principles of government, warfare, and social and economic order. The message and example of early Islam could never be superseded; they were of universal and eternal validity.

> Islam is not constrained by time or space, for it is eternal. . . . what Muhammad permitted is permissible until the Day of Resurrection; what he forbade is forbidden until the Day of Resurrection. It is not permissible that his ordinances (*hudud*) be suspended, or that his teachings fall into disuse, or that the punishments [he set] be abandoned, or that the taxes he levied be discontinued, or that the defense of Muslims and their lands cease (Khumayni: 25).

Here was a stirring arrogance. For a civilization possessed of so unequivocal a monopoly of truth, the possibility that rival outsiders had also come to possess powerful and persuasive truths, was inadmissible.

Nevertheless, those other truths—science grounded in rigorous rationalism, respect for the spirit of free inquiry, and individualism—achieved for the West that global primacy that Islam had once seen as its own manifest destiny. The rise of Europe left the promise of Islam unredeemed; the inheritance passed to others. Even the Muslims themselves finally succumbed to a radiant energy of the West that touched Islam's most remote recesses with radical effects. Religious belief was assaulted, and the secular idea spread; the influence of religious institutions dwindled with the rise of secular elites. Islamic law receded before a new idea of justice; Islamic education withdrew before a new idea of knowledge. The tacit legitimacy once conferred upon traditional rule by

its militant defense of Islam no longer sufficed; legitimacy was now said to be conferred by the *Volonté générale*, expressed through participatory democracy, populist parties, or officers corps. The state, once responsible for little more than warfare and taxation, was rapidly expanded and centralized, while allegiance was wrested from mosque, dynasty, family and sect, to be invested in the nation-state. Dress, custom, and language were all altered; the time-worn role of women was vigorously challenged. Old and established economic structures yielded to what are called rationalist modes of organization. The cities, the first settings to modernize and industrialize, generated new wealth; their magnetism bled an impoversihed and crowded countryside of its unwanted humanity. In the transformed cities, a once-integrated social order was atomized, reduced to what Durkheim called "the dust of individuals," breaking the traditional rhythm of both metropolis and countryside. Discontinuity was now the rule. Here, and everywhere was the indelible stamp of the West: Janus-faced, sometimes creative, sometimes destructive, but always a reminder of dependency, of how a once-confident community lost its sense of self-sufficiency.

Amid this turbulence, there are some Muslims who brood over what they once were, and believe that history must somehow right itself. They yearn to restore what nearly 200 years of abrasive contact with the West eroded: an idea of community, an equilibrium with the wider world, and a sense of "authenticity." These they possessed in an idyllic past, and they propose to restore those lost possessions by a faithful reconstruction of that past here in the present. Former Premier Mehdi Bazargan has said that Iran will go beyond Ottoman, Abbasid, and even Ummayad precedent, to restore government of the sort seen during the 10 years of the Prophet Muhammad's rule, and the 5 years under his son-in-law, the *Imam* Ali (IHT, February 7, 1979).

Perhaps here is the starting point of the many movements that comprise the Islamic movement; the collison with the West is the great shared experience of the modern Muslim

world. Each polity now has its Muslim faction, sometimes no more than a small circle, elsewhere embracing multitudes. Their ideas are not uniform, their visions of the future differ in very significant respects, but there are enough similarities in sentiment, vocabulary, and policy to afford a rough outline of their image of a reconstructed world of Islam. That new world, an incarnation of the old, is styled *al-nizam al-islami*—the Islamic order.

II. AN ISLAMIC ORDER: IDEALS

The State

In an age now past but not forgotten, nearly all Muslims lived in the shelter of an Islamic order. The Mughal, Ottoman, and Qajar empires, the last of the vast Muslim polities, identified themselves unreservedly with the cause of Islam, as had their predecessors. They and their allies were the "party of God"; their enemies were the "enemies of God." Their wars were always jihads "in the path of God," and the lives of their subjects were ordered by the infallible laws of God. Their decrees they issued in the name of God alone, for sovereignty was God's, to be exercised by man solely on His behalf. Prosperity, for man and state, was by the grace of God.

These regimes disintegrated, however, and, following an interlude of foreign rule, were replaced by scores of lesser states driven by the new notion of a secular order. These new polities invested the nation with those attributes once reserved for God: sovereignty, infallibility, and immortality. Government was now to serve the will of the people; service to God was henceforth a matter left to individual conscience. Islam and the state were put asunder by political and legal acts that followed so closely on foreign precedent as to approach conscious mimicry. There was little choice: before

the modern intrusion of the West, the languages of Muslim peoples possessed no word for secularism.

The first step toward the revivification of an Islamic order is thus the refutation of the secular idea and the reunion of the state with its appointed mission. "Politics is a part of religion," asserted the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's 'General Guide', Hasan al-Banna (assassinated in 1949). "Islam encompasses the ruler and the ruled. Thus there is not in its teachings a rendering to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God that which is God's. Rather . . . Caesar and what belongs to Caesar is for God Almighty alone." Khumayni concurs:

> Do not heed those who imagine that Islam is like present-day Christianity, that the mosque is no different than the church, or that Islam is merely a relationship between the individual and his Lord . . . Imperialist institutions instilled evil in the hearts of men, saying that religion does not meet with politics . . . Most unfortunately, some of us have given credence to those lies (Khumayni: 10, 138).

Hasan al-Banna thus rejects the concept of the temporal state; Khumayni repudiates that of the spiritual church. To discern such institutions in Islam is nonsensical; in their visions of the future, religion and state are inseparably entwined.

So it was in the idealized past. The Prophet Muhammad himself, writes Khumayni, formed a government. He appointed governors, sat in judgement, dispatched ambassadors, concluded treaties, and waged war (Khumayni: 24-5). The obligation to follow this precedent of political commitment is still binding upon all believers. "No Muslim can say that he does not engage in politics," said Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi, once rector of Al-Azhar and himself a willing agent of kings. "Were he to say so, he would be ignorant of his religion. How could he make such a sweeping statement since his religion laid down principles governing peace and war, treaties and alliances?" When a delegation of *al-Fath*, principal constituent of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-

tion, was denied entry to a 1969 Islamic conference of 23 states in Kuala Lumpur, on the grounds that the conference was not "political," the delegation countered that their exclusion was inadmissible as Islam did not differentiate between politics and religion (Al-Ahram, April 26, 1969). *Al-Fath* was awarded observer status.

Just as politics and Islam are inseparable, power and Islam are inseparable. Islam, the "religion of God," cannot play the role of a loyal opposition, for there can be no higher authority, no more compelling loyalty. Says Iran's radio: "Those who do not govern according to the laws given by God are infidels, oppressive, and corrupt . . . Islam is a state; Islam is a government" (BBC/ME, February 15, 1979). So the state must avow that it serves the cause of Islam–that it is, in fact, a willing instrument of God in His design. Pre-modern Muslim polities rarely acted without explicit reference to Islam; their rulers invariably styled themselves protectors, pillars, and swords of Islamic realms in their correspondence and decrees. The state thus collectively affirmed its faith as does the individual believer through the *shahada*: There is but one God, and Muhammad is His prophet.

Most Muslims now insist on some sort of a return to collective avowal, and it is widely achieved through a standard article in the constitutions of all but a handful of states populated by Muslim majorities: Islam is declared to be the state religion. By that short profession of faith, these states have defined themselves Muslim states, and so acknowledge Islam's relevance to the legitimate exercise of authority. This is not a formality that passes without notice. The omission of such an article in 1973 from a new draft constitution for Syria, served as the pretext for rioting. A few states go yet further, and offer an additional profession: they name themselves Islamic republics. Pakistan, Mauritania, and now Iran (through referendum) are self-avowedly Muslim through their official appellations. An article in the constitution, or an official designation, are not yet acts; but they are symbolic

self-statements and a necessary prelude to any restoration of Islam to political primacy.

The Law

There is more to an Islamic order, however, than ambiguous credos. "Islam is an application of the laws of God at the official level," continues Iran's radio. And in a past era, much of life was moored to the *shari'a,* a highly developed system of law and ethics. So crucial was the role of the shari'a that the dar al-islam itself was often defined as those lands where the writ of Islamic law ran unimpeded. Drawn principally from the Quran and the Prophet's personal example, then refined through jurisprudence, the shari'a provided a systematic justice that satisfied many of the changing requirements of Muslims for over a millenium and across wide expanses. Islamic law had always been under stress, but it did not snap until the disruptive arrival of the Napoleonic code.

A new justice then usurped the authority of Islamic law in field after field. Based on the positive rights of man rather than a revealed set of obligations, Western law was confessedly the work of human intellect, and so responded with innovation wherever Muslim jurists retreated to precedent. The Western campaign against Islamic law was relentless: Quranic punishments were ridiculed as cruel and outdated, and the separation of non-Muslims into a subordinate and autonomous legal genus, a principle that dates to the earliest Muslim conquests, was deemed incompatible with the idea of equality under one law. The system of taxation based on Quranic prescriptions and confessional affiliation was rejected as ineffective and discriminatory. Islam's great legal legacy was portrayed as systematic injustice, riddled with indefensible inequities. Unable to answer its critics, immobilized by rigid jurists, Islamic law gradually receded before Western law. Some Muslim states went so far as to adopt

(under duress or by choice) entire legal codes from European models and to abolish shari'a courts. Lawyers, jurists, and judges were no longer drawn from the *madrasahs*, forums of traditional education, but from law faculties of modern universities.

For some, the decline of the shari'a has disemboweled Islam, and the reconstruction of Islamic law is considered essential to the function of a new Islamic order. It is no coincidence, they might say, that a precipitous rise in lawlessness has followed the imposition of a Western law both ineffectual and unsuited for the needs of other societies. Islamic law once provided a far more binding social contract, and can do so again. Khumayni, ever the maximalist, insists on full restoration of the shari'a. "You have no need for new legislation; simply put into effect that which has already been legislated for you. This will save you a good deal of time and effort. . . . Everything, praise be to God, is ready-made for use" (Khumayni: 134).

The model, again, is to be found in early Islam. "The Prophet severed hands, administered floggings and stonings; after him, the duties of his successors were no less than his own" (Khumayni: 23). So Iran's legal code, drawn not from the Prophet's example but from French and Belgian statutes, must be discarded. In the criminal sphere, the Islamic punishments (hudud) must be reinstated and administered by shari'a courts. Matters of personal status must again be determined by the shari'a provisions; banking practices and taxation must be altered to meet the requirements of Islamic law. Hudud were partially restored by Iran's *komitehs* even before the adoption of a new constitution or legal code, and the speculation is that the bulk of criminal cases, all family cases, and some civil cases will be handed over to shari'a courts.

Iranian legal practice may well eventually resemble that of Saudi Arabia, where the shari'a still regulates most fields of activity lost to Western-style codes elsewhere. Under Saudi influence, the application of Islamic law has become com-

monplace in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and the smaller Gulf states. And in February 1979, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq promulgated an order and five ordinances that reintroduced Islamic punishments for adultery, theft, and defamation, and expanded the Islamic prohibition of alcohol to all Pakistani nationals regardless of religion. The traditional taxes of *zakat* and *ushr* were to be reinstated in 1979; state lending institutions were to cease lending at fixed interest rates (condemned by most jurists as "usury") and shift to equity participation. The entire body of Pakistani law (much of it drawn from English practice) would be submitted to the test of whether "any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunna of the Holy Prophet" (Dawn Overseas, February 17, 1979).

Similar draft legislation (including the death penalty for apostasy to Islam) was before Egypt's People's Assembly in 1977, but met with no success because of stiff opposition from the Coptic minority. Still, Egypt and a number of other states have opted for constitutional formulas that refer to Islamic law as "the principal source of legislation" or stipulate that no law shall be enacted that directly contradicts the shari'a. These imprecise provisions make for a good deal more latitude, but they evidence the enduring need of political authority to strike some sort of compromise with an Islamic law that serves both as a source of legitimacy and as a remedy for rising crime in those societies being turned over by rapid change.

An Islamic order should unite religion and politics, establish an avowedly Muslim state, and enforce some degree of Islamic law. On these points there is a vague and unarticulated consensus among committed Muslims. Opinion then divides over the principles of an Islamic political system, an Islamic economic order, an Islamic social program, an Islamic foreign policy—the substance of politics. Iranians may agree

to the establishment of an Islamic republic, but unanimity ends where discussion turns from broad principles to details. Of this, Khumayni was aware during his brief exile in Neauphle-le-Chateau, where he studiously evaded all detailed reference to his vision of the future: "As for the program of an Iranian Islamic republic, it will be declared later." The revolution was in a delicate stage; unity was essential and silence was golden. In the current transformation from slogan to reality, however, the vision of an Islamic order has been opened to reveal varied, often contradictory interpretations.

The Political System

The division of opinion over Islamic principles of political organization has most dramatically split the ranks of the single cause. Islamic political thought at the dawn of the modern era had evolved in a direction that subordinated means to end. *Any* form of government was tolerated as long as it enabled Muslims to fulfill their Muslim obligations and defend them. Even Khumayni said that current rulers, if they recognized and followed the "Islamic program," would not be driven from their seats: "Rather, we will leave those of them who are obedient and faithful to [the program's] execution in their places" (Khumayni: 135).

Muslim critics of the status quo are now agreed that the present system is intolerable. Government's very structure is but institutionalized amorality, led by individuals drawn to no higher purpose than self-aggrandizement. The art of government must be rediscovered, again in past precedent.

The practice of the Prophet and Quranic injunctions, however, are readily interpreted in a variety of senses, none of which any outsider should consider definitive. It is often said, for instance, that the Prophet ruled by consultation with his followers as a first among equals, and that the decisions of the early Muslim community were taken collectively through

a sort of proto-democracy. Khumayni, on the other hand, admits no limits to the Prophet's authority:

> Government in Islam means obedience to the law and its arbitration. The authority of the Prophet and his legal successors after him was derived from God. God commanded obedience to the Prophet and those in authority after him: 'Obey the Prophet and those in authority among you' [Quran, iv, 59]. There is no room for opinions or passions in the government of Islam, since the Prophet, *imams,* and people followed the will of God and His shari'a (Khumayni: 43).

Dispute over the precedent set by an idealized past carries over to debate on the future. The controversy now fueled by the historical argument revolves around whether an Islamic order must incorporate democratic institutions. In October 1978, Ayatullah Shariatmadari told an interviewer that "we want dictatorship to be replaced by true democracy," and that Khumayni "wants to set up a democratic government based on Islamic law" (FBIS/ME, October 30, 1978). After the revolution, Premier Bazargan continued to link an Islamic order to democracy:

> If we consider Islam and democracy as synonymous and group them together it is because they are another expression of the behest of God and the people, of the Creator and His creatures. The call of God is the call of the people; and the call of the pious people is the call of God. Therefore, the government of the Islamic Republic is a democratic republic and a genuine, democratic republic is Islamic (BBC/ME, 12 February 1979).

Ayatullah Qumi reproached "those abroad who accuse the Iranian people's struggle of being reactionary and retrograde," arguing that "we are fighting against absolutism, since only democracy can promote spiritual and human progress" (Le Monde, November 12-13, 1978). Even Khumayni, at one point while still in exile, said that the Islamic republic would be "a people's democracy" (Le Monde, November 15, 1978), although that phrase usually recalls the authoritarian regimes

of Eastern Europe rather than the traditions of Westminster; nor did he hesitate to denounce Shapur Bakhtiar's government as "undemocratic and unrepresentative" (IHT, January 11, 1979).

Since his return to Iran, however, Khumayni has clarified his position:

> What the nation wants is an Islamic republic, not just a republic, not a democratic republic, nor a democratic Islamic republic. Do not use this word 'democratic'. That is the Western style. We respect Western civilization but we will not follow it. (Guardian, March 2, 1979). Our problem is that we are too much influenced by the West. For long years, we have been under the influence of America. It will take time to change, but you have to make an effort. You say we are standing on our own feet now, but you are still talking of a democratic republic, which means a Western republic (IHT, March 8, 1979).

Khumayni's remarks do not constitute the rejection of a mere word discredited for its Greek etymology and traditional association with Western institutions. Several eloquent advocates of an Islamic order have put forth compelling reasons for their rejection of the concept behind the term. Islam is "the very antithesis of secular, Western democracy," writes Abu'l Ala al-Mawdudi, elderly guide of the *Jamiat-i-Islami*, the foremost of Pakistan's rising *Islampasand* (Islam-loving) parties. "The philosophical foundation of Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Lawmaking is their prerogative and legislation must correspond to the mood and temper of their opinion. . . . Islam . . . altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the viceregency (*khilafat*) of man." And Khumayni has said much the same thing. Islamic government is constitutional (*dusturi*), he says, but not in the widely understood sense of representation by parliamentary regime or people's assemblies: "One can distinguish between Islamic government and constitutional regimes, both monarchical and republican. In

the latter, it is the representatives of the people or the king who legislate, whereas [in the former] the authority to legislate rests with God Almighty . . . no one can enforce that which God did not reveal." He speaks of "bankrupt representative parliamentary assemblies" (Khumayni: 39, 41-2).

Conflict is inescapable. Bazargan believes that "the call of God is the call of the people; and the call of the pious people is the call of God," while Mawdudi and Khumayni counter that the will of God should never be confused with the "mood and temper" of man. Practically speaking, Bazargan is led to entrust representative institutions with a wide scope, while Khumayni has said that Islam has no place for a legislative branch at all. The political system advocated by Khumayni (in his published work) would rest instead upon just Muslims who best understand God-given law. These are the *fuqaha,* Islam's jurist-scholars. The mantle of the Prophet has fallen to them. "The fuqaha are rulers over kings," runs a *hadith* cited by Khumayni; "the believing fuqaha are the fortresses of Islam," runs another. Obedience to them is equated by Khumayni with obedience to God and His Prophet. Most of Khumayni's book on Islamic government is an exhortation to the fuqaha to meet their obligation to exercise authority and enforce the law on behalf of God.

Here are the roots of the current struggle between Bazargan's government and Khumayni's komitehs, between Tehran and Qum: conflicting interpretations of the legacy of Islam and the idealized past. There are yet other interpretations. The Saudis stress *shura* (consultation) through a committee of influentials; here and there are faint references to the revival of a caliphate, the viceregency of God invested in one elect individual (e.g., Haq, 1978). Obviously, consensus on what sort of political system complies with an Islamic order is distant. Military rule of a Qaddhafi, Saudi-style monarchy, rule by secret committees, theologians, caliphs, and elected representatives—each has its adherents. Khumayni says: "Monarchy and hereditary monarchy are sinister and worthless forms of government." A monarch (King Hassan of

Morocco) replies: "That is the heresy of the Shi'i, that he wants to impose something which does not exist in Islam, namely a clergy" (BBC/ME, February 10, 1979). The perennial problem of Islam and government draws no closer to a solution.

No matter what form of Islamic government Muslims eventually establish, there is no question that the ideal regime should be manned and must be led by Muslims. On this, the medieval jurists were unequivocal; there were many kinds of Muslim tyranny, but all were theoretically preferable to the insufferable rule by non-Muslims over Muslims. The religion of God was Islam, and His authority could only be vested in Muslims; the practice of government by non-Muslims was wholly illegitimate. In truth, Muslims were often ill-tolerated as minorities, and so were encouraged by their brethren to flee the territories that fell, by conquest, under non-Muslim jurisdiction. This was eventually cast as a religious obligation, and justified by Quranic citations. The Ottoman government systematically resettled Muslims from its lost territories elsewhere, and some of these populations survive as distinct communities. As recently as 1920, some 40,000 Muslims abandoned their homes in India at the behest of ulama who had decided that India under British rule was no longer dar al-islam. The government of Muslims by Muslims was at the foundation of an Islamic order then, and partially remains so. The constitutions of several countries provide that the head of state must be of the Muslim faith. Even the laic regime of Baathist Syria was led to include such a provision in a 1973 draft constitution after protests. Public demonstrations of faith by heads of state—observance of prayer, performance of pilgrimage, or the regular resort to Quranic citation—are standard media fare. And although Muslims are no longer enjoined to flee the imposition of non-Muslim rule, few are the Muslim peoples and minorities that are wholly reconciled to government by others. The political indigestibility of Mus-

lims disturbs polities as scattered as the Philippines, India, Ethiopia, Israel, Cyprus, perhaps even the Soviet Union.

The Economy

When discussion turns to the economic system truest to Islamic principles, there is again profound disagreement. Whether Islam sanctions private or collective ownership, capitalist or socialist modes of production, or perhaps something in between—these are all contested questions.

Again, arguments draw upon the idealized past. In attacking the Saudis in 1966, Gamal Abd al-Nasir told an interviewer: "You mention what [the] Prophet Muhammad owned and what King Faysal now owns, and you will find the answer to his allegations that he represents Islam. Islam calls for sharing the loaf of bread with your brothers, which, in the modern age, means socialism" (BBC/ME, May 12, 1966). And Nasir's Egypt became the center for the propagation of Islamic socialist theories. The idea survives. An example is the exhortation of Qaddhafi's colleague, Abd al-Salam Ahmad Jallud, to a 1973 conference of foreign ministers in Tripoli: "Brothers, Islam is right; Islam is revolution; Islam is progressiveness; Islam is socialism; Islam is social justice. Brothers, any country which regards socialism as apostasy and which rejects progressiveness as apostasy is actually discrediting and disclaiming this tolerant mission" (FBIS/ME, March 26, 1973). An extreme example of the socialist interpretation appeared in Cairo's *Ruz al-Yusuf* on July 12, 1976, where an "intellectual" claiming to represent the "religious left" was interviewed ("Should the Muslim Brotherhood rise again, I would be on its left wing. If a leftist organization should appear, I would be in its religious wing.") In his view, Islam opposed private ownership of land, the Prophet Muhammad had instituted a social revolution on behalf of the poor and oppressed, and "religion in capitalist

society is hypocrisy." Even construction of mosques was forbidden in Islam as long as the unemployed went in need of factories and Muslims had to sleep on the pavement for lack of housing. Prayer, if need be, could be performed in the open air, for the floor of the desert served as the Prophet's mosque.

Regimes that have pursued collectivist policies, as Nasir had, have retreated to this version of Islamic economy in the face of criticism. South Yemen's Abd al-Fattah Ismail told assembled ulama that Islam means "rejecting and fighting persecution and the exploitation of man by his fellow man," and that class struggle had precedents in Islam (JPRS, 71660). Afghanistan's Nur Muhammad Taraki claimed that "if we are introducing reforms, it is not contrary to Islam, for equality, fraternity and social justice are clearly an article of faith in the holy dogmata of Islam" (JPRS, 71887).

But for others, "Islam does not recognize class war"—the resolution of a Saudi-sponsored Islamic conference in 1962—and upholds the "legitimate rights of individuals." In 1975, Shaykh al-Azhar Abd al-Halim Mahmud wrote an article for *Akhir Sa'ah* where he argued the irreconcilability of Islam and Marxism. The very words socialism and Marxism were inapplicable. Said the Azhar's deputy director: "Why do we borrow strange imported terms for our society[?] . . . Refraining from the use of these foreign terms will prevent confusion between the teachings of Islam and those of socialism and Marxism" (JPRS, 65886). The vitriolic exchange that followed between *Akhbar al-Yawm* and *Ruz al-Yusuf* on Islam and Marxism led the government (through the Arab Socialist Union) to suspend temporarily the press debate over Islamic principles and economic thought.

Perhaps the most insistent view holds that Islam provides the foundations of a unique and superior economic system. Twenty-five years ago, Anwar Sadat said that the economic system of Islam constituted "a happy medium between greedy Western capitalism and the slavery of Soviet commu-

nism." Qaddhafi has placed Islamic economy "squarely between exploitative capitalism and totalitarian socialism; it finds its sources in the precepts of Islam. . . . It allows all, rich and poor both, to build a society of abundance and justice" (Le Monde, May 6, 1971). What these statements purport to say is unclear. The system in mind is perhaps what one might identify as a form of state capitalism or *étatism*, or may have no definable content at all. One can only comment that belief in the manifest relation of certain economic systems to certain religious traditions has fallen into disrepute. The links drawn by Weber between capitalism and Protestantism have come under relentless criticism; Werner Sombart's capitalist Judaism is wholly discredited. Now Maxime Rodinson's work has shown that Muslims have accommodated their revealed texts to a wide variety of economic practices; in the economic sphere, Islam does not dictate.

There is perhaps a strand of social justice that is common to most Muslim visions of a new order, but even that strand is threadbare. Islamic social justice in some instances may imply no more than the compulsory collection of alms (zakat) by the state in the form of an income tax and its distribution through welfare agencies. Or it may mean, in Ayatullah Shariatmadari's words, "an equal distribution of riches." The idea that Muslims should control their own resources and industries is also widespread. Khumayni adds, "The country's economy, likewise, will be freed from dependence on foreign countries, and the economic plans will no longer be in harmony with the interests of the international companies in Iran" (FBIS/ME, November 20, 1979). The appropriate limits of foreign enterprise are hardly agreed upon, however. A wide variety of oil policies are justified in Islamic terms. Jidda's *al-Ukaz* (August 10, 1979) editorialized that "Saudi Arabia's insistence on stabilizing the oil prices and on connecting these prices, both negatively and positively, to the degrees of economic prosperity in the world reflects the Islamic philosophy to which we adhere. . . . The first require-

ment of this philosophy is the rejection of injustices in dealings and the exploitation of the rights of others." Khumayni, on the other hand, would argue that the oil "monopolies" have committed such injustices, and so would Qaddhafi; neither has been among those whom the consumers choose to call "price moderates." Without definitive guidelines in Islam, economic policy must be determined on a pragmatic basis; justifications are then drawn from the inexhaustable reservoir of Islamic precedent. That economic policies should be legitimized by linking them to principles set by God speaks of insecurity, of a lack of public confidence in policy made solely by man. The economic dislocations of change are among the most severe; that Muslims should now seek some sort of remedy drawn from their past speaks of their profound discomfort with the inequality that splits societies thrust too precipitously into modernity.

Society

Societies in Muslim Asia and Africa exchanged influences with Western societies from the very inception of Islam. Many of the achievements of both civilizations were the product of an exchange of ideas and a cultural symbiosis between an Islam and a West even during periods of military rivalry. The rise of the modern West ended that fair exchange; it had been predicated upon a certain equilibrium, and that balance had ended. The preponderant influence of the West now overwhelmed Muslim societies; they were broken open. The question asked by advocates of an Islamic order is whether society must again be sealed up and, protected in order to restore "authenticity" and integrity. How much diversity can be tolerated?

The societal role of women is perhaps the most controversial of these questions. Khumayni's confrontation with Iranian women activists over the *chador,* abortion, and divorce

and property rights is too well known to bear repetition. There are, however, other issues of comparable importance. What is to become of non-Muslim minorities and Muslim sects not in accord with the majority—both common conduits of foreign ideas and customs? Can faded standards of morality, education, and entertainment be restored? What of freedom of expression, of the press?

The direction that consciously Islamic orders have taken is undeniably toward conformism and the reassertion of conservative norms. This is not extraordinary in societies under stress, but in an Islamic order, the enforcement of norms is not left to social consensus but to state coercion. In an earlier era there were state-appointed officers to oversee vast spheres of moral conduct. Khumayni has now proposed a "Ministry of Righteous Behavior and Prevention of Sin" (Guardian, March 24, 1979) that would fulfill roughly the same task, now so decentralized and performed on an arbitrary basis by virtually autonomous komitehs. Saudi Arabia has always had similar officers charged with supervision of moral bearing and religious observance. The less subtle enforcers in Muslim states have inconvenienced, arrested, or punished men and women who offended a collective sense of propriety. They have intimidated and shut newspapers, regulated entertainment media, and enforced the performance of religious rituals. They have harassed heterodox sects on the fringes of Islam and religious minorities.

There is no reason to suppose that these methods need characterize all Islamic orders, or that such tactics even differ much from those that prevail in ever-widening parts of the world. The current strain, however, like premodern precedent, is suspicious of social pluralism, and openly hostile. Such collective moral authoritarianism represents perhaps a last attempt to shore up a sense of communal solidarity threatened by a spreading individualism.

A composite Islamic order, then, provides for a state integrated with faith, a state self-avowedly Muslim, led by Muslims, in which the law of Islam enjoys a privileged position. The political system, of whatever kind, is said to follow Islamic precedent; the economic system, of whatever sort, is held to exemplify Islamic values of social justice. Society is aligned with the state's interpretation of Islamic principles, and the state enforces that interpretation through state institutions. Further, (in anticipation of our separate treatment of foreign policy) the state recognizes a special obligation toward other Muslim states and peoples.

What lies beyond these broadest of outlines? "Who is the one who determines what is truth," Walter Ulbrecht once queried, "And what complies with the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine?" No one interprets Islam in a sense binding upon all believers; like the present world of Marxism-Leninism, the world of Islam possesses no single nucleus. There is (as yet) no prestigious center for the propagation of the true faith, no compelling leader to whom the faithful look for authoritative pronouncements, no model Islamic order to which all turn in emulation. An Islamic order is in truth many orders, many nostalgias, many visions of the future. There are those across Asia and Africa who do call for Islam, who proclaim in harmony that "the Quran is our constitution," but beyond the single slogan are countless ideals. Would Iqbal then call them "likeminded"?

III. AN ISLAMIC ORDER: REALITIES

Advocates of an Islamic order (however conceived) must compete. Khumayni's success in Iran has encouraged some to conclude that political Islam is irresistable; it is not. Africa and Asia are ideological cauldrons, and the competition among ideas, milleniums, and nostalgias is keen. The conviction and sentiment amassed behind secular nationalism over the last 60 or more years, is not at all negligible. Attaturk, Nasir, and Aflaq not only still have their followings, but their followers rule, and have built wide constituencies. Even in Iran, vanguard of the revolution, the secular nationalist cause, nurtured under the Pahlevis, is not yet dead.

What must be understood is that the Islamic alternative does not enjoy the same advantages or suffer the same disabilities from polity to polity. Not every ruler has made the same mistakes as Muhammad Reza Pahlevi; not every fiery mosque orator is an Ayatullah Khumayni. Nor is the impact of the West an even one, and not all peoples have known a trauma identical to the Iranian. To appreciate the similarities and differences, the Islamic alternative must be weighed separately under each set of circumstances.

The Muslims of particular interest to Americans are those who live within the "Northern Tier" and across the border in the Soviet Union, those in the Arab-Israeli arena, and those living over large reservoirs of petroleum. On the following

pages, political Islam in some of the states of these strategic regions is discussed.

Iran

Iran's revolution is not yet one year old. When the October Revolution observed its first anniversary, the Bolsheviks were almost universally misunderstood, and the character of their leaders was widely distorted. We believe ourselves to know more about Iran than we did about Russia in 1918, and that is almost certainly so. The idea that sustained Iran's revolution will, nevertheless, elude us for several years to come. After all, in this period when "counter-revolution" agitates Iran, it would appear that the idea continues to elude even Iranians.

How might future historians then explain Iran's revolution, once that event belongs squarely to history? They will have no difficulty documenting foreign exploitation, the oil-fueled economic dislocations of rapid and uneven growth, the near-collapse of traditional commerce, the burden of a bloated military, and the social effects of relentless modernization. The oppressiveness of political life under the Pahlevis will not escape notice, the failure of liberalization will be much discussed. These are all classic symptoms of revolutionary situations, and few historians will miss them. The complications will perhaps arise in trying to define the role of Islam. They will account for revolution; but will they unravel *Islamic* revolution?

Even as the streets of Iran's cities teemed with demonstrators shouting "God is great" and demanding the return of an aged mullah, the Islamic face of Iran's revolution was depicted as a mask. Islam was no more than a convenient vehicle for the expression of accumulated political, economic, and social grievances; the mullahs led the struggle by default since other opponents of the regime were unable to raise their heads without inviting the worst sort of SAVAK

retribution. The mullahs themselves, in any case, did not want to exercise power and there would be no theocracy. After his return, Khumayni himself but a symbol of rectitude and perseverence would return to Qum where he would again teach at the Faizia madrasah, and act (in the words of an unidentified U.S. official) as an "ultimate moral arbiter," rather than a political major domo (IHT, February 3-4, 1979).

This has not happened. "The remaining one or two years of my life I will devote to you to keep this movement alive," said Khumayni on his return to Qum (IHT, March 2, 1979). Iran is now governed—as much as it can be governed—by a revolutionary committee that answers to Khumayni (and to his son Ahmad, Ibrahim Yazdi, and Abbas Amir Entezam), and in which religious dignitaries play an important if not preponderant role. Revolutionary rhetoric continues to draw almost solely on Islamic imagery and terminology, and the new regime insists on the Islamic adjective at every opportunity. There is no other sanctioned form of expression; even critics of the regime and its komitehs must word their programs with deference to Islam, and sometimes appeal to dissident mullahs to lead them in opposition. The mosques are vibrant centers of administration and justice. Why this resilience of the Islamic idiom now that the revolution's goals have been achieved?

In fact, the revolution has *not* achieved its goals. A significant number of Iranians wanted more than an end to foreign domination, savage capitalism, and official terrorism—these, a Mossadegh could have provided. But 30 years ago the needs of Iranians were simpler, when a straightforward, nationalist-like Mossadegh could fill them, before the concerted Pahlevi effort at renewal threatened to leave Iran a cultural wasteland. Once again, Iranians wish to commune with their past—not the bogus past offered by the Shah at Persepolis in 1971, a past no one could remember—but the tangible, "authentic" past, the kind that evokes the lives of integrity led by fathers and grandfathers. Khumayni's own worn visage of seventy-

nine years is not irrelevant to this kind of longing: he is an elder, in a revolution that venerates age, that represents a collective passion for reminiscence. Bazargan, one might add, is over seventy. It is a telling sign when any people, particularly a people as demographically young as the Iranian, turns to those advanced in years to provide its vision of the future. This attitude suggests that Iran's solution is to be sought in an era now gone but not irretrievable.

What was the nature of this era? The religious dignitaries recalled days when their madrasahs were full of students, their mosques were well endowed, and much of Iran was their constituency. Reza Shah then initiated the Pahlevi policy of whittling away at the prerogatives of the ulama, and met with considerable success. Shariatmadari once claimed that the Shi'i ulama remained "independent of the government financially. We accept no aid from the government and the Shi'a religious scholars in Iran do not live on government salaries. They are independent and are not considered a part of the government" (JPRS, 71660). But until 1977, the government was said to have annually appropriated $80 million to religious leaders for distribution as they saw fit—a contribution cut to $30 million when Iran began to run a budgetary deficit (IHT, January 16, 1979). Pressure had also been brought to bear through various fiscal and land reforms that deprived religious institutions of revenues and endowments. Enrollment at the madrasahs could be curtailed, even at Qum's Faizia madrasah. If these measures failed, there was always exile (Khumayni's lot after 1964), imprisonment (the sentence of Ayatullah Taleqani), or even assassination (perhaps the fate of Dr. Ali Shariati in 1977). Enough of the remaining ulama were compromised so that Khumayni saw fit to denounce what he described as "enemies of Islam" masquerading in the clothing of men of religion, to speak of "cleansing the religious centers," and to plead against the prevailing silence of ulama in the face of tyranny. Since the revolution, some of them have, in fact, been executed or

imprisoned for collaboration with the ancien régime. The ulama had suffered greatly at the hands of Iran's shahs; they were neither unblemished nor immune. Indeed, had their collective integrity, prestige, and wealth survived intact, they might not have been willing or able to lead the revolution.

The bazaars, fortresses of the revolution, had suffered too. At one time, there had been no economy outside the bazaar economy, there had been no other entrepreneurial class. That economy and class were governed by a set of values moored to Islam. Much of the effort of ulama went to the elaboration of a bazaar business ethic within the shari'a, and much of the bazaar's surplus wealth went, in return, to religious institutions (a sum most recently put at $320 million annually). The alliance is an old one, and had been tested before.

A fundamentally pre-capitalist order, however, could not withstand the coming of oil. Big business had arrived: banks, state monopolies, foreign concerns, multinational corporations, and unscrupulous local entrepreneurs. The lucrative contracts went to these, while the bazaar was left to contend with a rigid price control policy coupled with spiraling inflation. The bazaar's share of Iran's commerce dwindled; it became clear that the industrial society envisioned by government planners for 20 years hence would have little room for bazaars or their crafts and trade. They were to become redundant; an eight-lane highway was slated to run through the very center of Tehran's bazaar.

In the squat, crumbling buildings south of Shah Reza, the avenue that so thoroughly divides Tehran, were to be found the rank and file: the laborers, porters, street hawkers, vendors, those without skills and those without work. Only somewhat better off were the workers in the towns that sprang up around centers of oil production. Their stake in the status quo was minimal. "We believe a large majority of Iranians thoroughly approve of the very substantial improvements that have been made in living standards and economic and social opportunities during the past three decades," said

Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders in his testimony before a House subcommittee in June 1978. Saunders had lost sight of South Tehran and similar quarters throughout Iran, and of the fact that by 1976, 10 percent of Iranians were responsible for 40 percent of consumption, leaving the remnant with a minimal and dwindling share of these "very substantial improvements."

This majority, however, was not wholly impoverished, without roots or memories. The lives of the growing ranks of workers, common laborers, and unemployed were dignified by Islam; through faith in a proximate God they maintained a sense of personal worth under a system that devalued life. Their sole inheritance was faith in an Islam left to them and brought from the countryside as a form of sustenance. Even this comfort, the "Shah-People Revolution" tried to seize and regulate.

There were other centers of revolution, but the mosque, the bazaar, the traditional quarters, and oil towns were the hub of Islamic revolution. Here, the redress of social and economic grievances and the demand for freedom were only part of the program. After all, virtually every party opposed to the monarchy embraced reformist platforms. But not any new regime could restore harmony with the past or a sense of historical continuity. Not any regime could evoke a sense of moral well-being and integrity, of purposefulness, of "authenticity," and, finally, of nearness to God. A better life meant not only freedom and material improvement, but also ethnical revival—a liberation of the spirit. Only Khumayni seemed to offer all; this is his source of strength. Khumayni's appeal is otherwise unintelligible.

So evocative is this quest for authenticity through Islam, that Iranians seem prepared to submit again to restrictions on personal freedom, and even to suffer considerable economic dislocation to achieve that higher purpose. The idea that discipline of the senses frees the spirit is not at all peculiar to Islam. When Khumayni bans music and mixed bathing or

demands the chador of female civil servants, he claims to seek to free minds from distraction and guide them to nobler ends; these are liberating edicts. If a free and quarrelsome press or some economic enterprises impede this quest, they can be considered forms of enslavement. In an age of ideology, can any measure of self-denial in pursuit of a compelling idea still astonish us? The Iranian people would not be the first to overthrow one authoritarian regime only to replace it with another and yet rejoice in their liberation.

Not everyone in Iran is rejoicing, of course, and challenges to Khumayni are emerging daily. Some Iranians fought revolutions that were not Islamic or only minimally so. "We fought in the revolution not out of religious conviction but for political goals," said Ayatullah Ezzedin Husayni, chosen leader of Iran's Kurds. "We want autonomy—our own parliament, our own languages, our own culture. The revolution has destroyed despotism, but it has not ended discrimination against minorities. The revolution must go on until all major minority groups—the Kurds here, the Turks in Azerbaijan, the Baluchis in the east—win a measure of autonomy. Iran is a big country and can be a federation of autonomous states like other big countries" (IHT, March 6, 1979). One must now add the Arabs of Khuzistan and the Turkomans of Gonbad-i Kavus to this list. Iran is indeed a large polity, one composed of different ethnic groups and sects within Islam. Beyond the Persian-speaking Shi'i community in the principal urban centers, Khumayni's appeal is much diminished. Other visions fire the ethnic minorities that constitute roughly half of Iran's population; they recall a past quite different from that of Khumayni, an era before the Pahlevis forged Iran into one polity subservient to Tehran.

Another vision inspires those in the middle classes and liberal circles gathered around Karim Sanjabi's National Front, the National Democratic Front of Hedayatullah Matin-Daftari, National Iranian Oil Company chairman Hasan Nazih, and others. Nazih criticized the regime for putting "all

political, economic and judicial problems into an Islamic mold" (Time, June 11, 1979). "We fought dictatorship and foreign domination," said Sanjabi, "but we are Iranians before being Muslims, and we will remain, above all, Iranians" (Le Monde, August 2, 1979). Shapur Bakhtiar, who has emerged from hiding to propose a secular state, made this curious remark: "Iran existed before Islam. If Iran has not become Islamicized in 1400 years, it is too late now to Islamicize it" (IHT, August 1, 1979).

Fedaiyan-i Khalq, Mujahidin-i Khalq, the Tudeh party, the elusive Forqan, and other factions—many centered on campuses—have programs that obviously diverge widely and often violently from current government policy. Even other ulama, most noticeably Ayatullah Kazem Shariatmadari (but also Ayatullah Mahmud Taleqani for a time), have split with Khumayni, and Bazargan's complaints from the inside are well publicized: "Our day has been turned into night," he has said (IHT, March 2, 1979).

These circles of dissent either have no interest in an Islamic order, or envision one different from Khumayni's. They question or resent the consolidation of political power in the mosques. Bakhtiar spoke for this school before the *majlis* in January 1979: "The eminent ayatullahs' position is far above entering into the political arena in the way you and I are engaged in here. They should guide and direct us in their spiritual capacity and tell us that the government should in this or that issue be inspired by the spirit and lofty teachings of Islam" (BBC/ME, January 18, 1979). But the ayatullahs should not govern; for this task, the professional politicians are better qualified. They would applaud Ayatullah Shariatmadari's reply to a question about his own political ambitions: "You might as well ask me if I'm going to open a shop in the bazaar. Being a merchant is a job. Being a politician is a job. But it's not my job" (IHT, January 22, 1979).

The boycotted elections for a constituent assembly have offered little clue to public preferences. A test of will, and

perhaps a test of strength, seem more likely. One might only note that there is already a network of vested interests behind the central revolutionary committee, the local komitehs, and the Islamic Guard, and that those who supported Khumayni's rise—never discouraged by overwhelming odds in the past—are hardly likely to be discouraged quickly now. "I warn these bandits and unlawful elements," said Khumayni of leftist groups, "that we were able to destroy the Shah and his evil regime, and we are strong enough to deal with them" (IHT, February 20, 1979). Khumayni and the ulama have stirred the people, and any contestant for power will have to accommodate the longings for greater adherence to Islam released by the revolution—what is truly "the same fist that destroyed the Shah" (Khumayni, New York Times, June 10, 1979).

Afghanistan

In late April 1978, the regime of President Muhammad Daud was overthrown in a violent coup staged by self-professedly Marxist political cadres (the Khalq) and their military allies. Before the year was out, the abrasive policies of the late President Nur Muhammad Taraki had provoked a revolt among Pushtu groups in Kunar province in the mountainous frontier region along the Pakistani border. Six months later, the uprising had spread to nearly all of Afghanistan's 28 provinces, reaching in one violent spasm as far west as Herat. "Tribal" defiance is traditional in parts of Afghanistan, but this time rebel spokesmen declared for a nobler cause: theirs was a jihad, a holy war, and an *inqilab-i islami*, an Islamic revolution. An exiled spokesman has said that the resistance seeks to establish "a real Islamic democratic government so that the people have freedom, justice, and equality according to Islamic law" (IHT, January 16, 1979).

Just what type of war or revolution the Afghan rebels are conducting is conjectural. Iran's revolution was staged in city

squares and along the broad avenues of Tehran, in full view of the wider world; Afghanistan's war is waged in remote regions and almost inaccessible highlands, often officially designated tribal territory. The Khalq was able to deny that any subversive activities were afoot. "Complete security prevails throughout the country," said Taraki (IHT, March 13, 1979). "Our revolution is a people's revolution, completely and sincerely supported by the people of the country. There is no resistance to our revolution whatsoever" (IHT, March 14, 1979). In no part of Afghanistan was there "any kind of resistance at all" (Guardian, March 23, 1979).

To maintain this fiction, Western reporters and diplomats were kept out of the troubled regions; most stories on the resistance were filed not from Afghanistan but from Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and New Delhi. The few foreigners who were permitted to report from within the country saw no more than a quiet (if terrified) Kabul and the relatively secure corridor through Jalalabad to Khyber. Information on the progress of the rebellion came from Afghan exiles and refugees in Pakistan whose accounts were of uncertain reliability, occasional State Department reports, and Soviet commentary. Under these circumstances, the roots and structure of the Afghan resistance remain enigmatic.

In many regions, rebellion certainly represented a response to Taraki's domestic strategy. Taraki and his successor Hafizullah Amin—doctrinaire revolutionaries—decided to recast Afghan society and launch the country on a forced march to socialist modernity. Land reform, in which some 200,000 families were to receive parcels of land from the estates of large landowners (IHT, March 13, 1979) was reported to be a popular measure that earned the regime allies, but was also reported to have been suspended because of its "disastrous results" (Le Monde, August 9, 1979). The effect of other policies is clearer. Taraki and Amin tried to advance a social revolution by outlawing established customs, incompatible with their vision of Afghanistan as a "working class state"

(IHT, February 24-25, 1979). They had no tolerance for the rival centers of authority that dominate Afghan life beyond the cities, and challenged the mullahs with imprisonment and execution. They relied on Soviet advisers—a credible estimate is 3,000—in the coercive enforcement of their theories. Social custom, veneration of mullahs, and an intense mistrust of strangers are integral parts of urban and rural Afghan life at several levels. They are intricately bound to the Islam of a people for whom God remains vivid and close at hand. To attack established ways, insult men of religion, and enter into a league with foreigners is an affront to God; to resist is to wage His war in defense of Islam.

The rebellion was more complex, however, and there were other allegiances at stake. Groups bound by familial ties to the late President Daud participated in the uprising and were thought to nurse a special grievance. Shi'is (among the Hazara) seemed particularly given to recalcitrance, perhaps in reaction to a traditional political primacy still enjoyed by Sunnis in Kabul; this conflict, too, overlaps tribal differences. Those who seized U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February 1979 were Shi'is protesting the detention of Shi'i *ulama*. Urban and military circles of dissent must also be growing, although an unsuccessful military mutiny in August 1979 was the only violent manifestation of this discontent. There are also rather scattered reports of military desertions to the ranks of the resistance. Several opposition groups have proclaimed their intent to establish an Islamic republic, but at least one faction advocates a restoration of the pre-Daud monarchy of King Muhammad Zahir Shah. To judge the weight of these motives is an involved task; here it must suffice only to acknowledge their existence, and to stress that there is more than one dimension to Afghanistan's rebellion.

The most vocal Afghans, however, chose to view their opposition to the regime as Islamic. Perhaps they do so in order to dignify a struggle for self-indulgent ends or to unify a scattered movement. That is one of the resilient qualities of

an Islamic appeal the capacity to legitimize and to touch imaginations. Significantly, the most offensive of the regime's many objectionable policies seemed to be the arrest of ulama. The seizure of Muhammad Ibrahim Mujaddidi, one of Kabul's leading religious figures, marked the passage of the opposition to an active phase in January 1979. One of the liberation organizations operating from Pakistan is now led by his family. We have another account of how an attempt by a government convoy to arrest a noted seventy-two-year-old religious leader in a village 75 miles from Kabul, led to a sudden armed resistance, and provoked a reprisal by MIG aircraft and helicopter gunships (Guardian, March 5, 1979). It would seem that Taraki's government singled out ulama as principal obstacles to the consolidation of the April revolution, since they awakened widely popular affections. They had therefore to be separated from politics. "Those religious leaders who are busy with religious performances and do not act against the interest of the people and the revolution will be respected," said Hafizullah Amin, in a remark that echoed Shapur Bakhtiar's views on the proper role of ayatullahs. "But those who instead of serving the sacred religion of Islam use religion as a means to serve the enemies of the revolution will face repercussions" (IHT, March 13, 1979). If scattered reports were reliable, many ulama faced those "repercussions."

The regime further recognized the compelling nature of the Islamic appeal by repeatedly refuting charges of atheism. "We are Muslim progeny, Muslim people, we have respect for the principles of the holy faith of Islam, and no one can contend that we are acting contrary to the religion of Islam," said Taraki. "... we honor Islam and the policy of the popular government firmly adheres to the principles of the holy religion of Islam" (JPRS, 71887). The Soviets resorted to aiding their ally with broadcast appeals to Afghans by Soviet ulama, who proclaimed that "those who ruled your lives before the blessed April maliciously distorted the

blessed principles of the sacred Quran," and also declared that the Taraki regime had done "that which is preached by holy Islam" (Guardian, March 24, 1979). Taraki proclaimed a "holy war" against those who, "under the veil of Islam put the sacred religion of Islam in the service of imperialism" (FBIS/ME, October 17, 1979). In our present state of ignorance about the Afghan opposition, these few facts and public statements appear magnified, perhaps to the point of distortion. It may well take the success of the rebellion to reveal the aims that have inspired it—a possibility which depends upon the uncertain and apparently unsettled morale of the Afghan army.

Turkey

"Although there has been unrest in both countries, the similarities, if any, are rather superficial." In these words Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit compared recent events in Iran and Turkey. "Secularism is deeply rooted in Turkey. The possibility of returning to a religious state is out of the question, it does not exist in Turkey" (IHT, March 9, 1979). Ecevit's remark was prompted by an organized massacre of Alevis in the southeastern Anatolian town of Kahraman Maraş on December 24-25, 1978. The Alevis are a minority sect ostensibly within Islam, who occupy parts of rural Anatolia; they comprise perhaps 15 percent of Turkey's population. Over 100 were killed during those December days when Sunni Muslims, some allegedly brought in from Ankara and other major cities, descended on Kahraman Maraş after a series of minor incidents (NYT, January 3, 1979).

Periods of heightened religious consciousness almost invariably raise the sensitivity of Muslims to sectarian differences within their own faith; it has been said that Turkey had entered precisely such a phase of reaction against half a century of state-enforced secularism. Martial law was

imposed upon 13 Turkish provinces in the immediate wake of the disturbances; appeals were broadcast for harmony; and the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that special teams would be sent to Kahraman Maras and other "sensitive" regions to promote fraternity, unity and tolerance between the two principal Muslim sects. Minister of State Lutfi Dogan declared 1979 a "year of enlightenment" (BBC/ME, January 1, and March 12, 1979). Unnamed Israeli sources were, however, already predicting that "Turkey will fall as Iran did" at the hands of "religious and anti-Western forces" (IHT, February 16, 1979); an American editorial advised that, "on its own particular lines, the Turkish analogy to Iran before the revolution broke out deserves thought and productive activity in Washington" (IHT, March 14, 1979).

Turkey is certainly experiencing a crisis of confidence. There is no need to recount here the economic troubles that have led a reluctant Ecevit to impose severe austerity measures, or to detail the violence that now so frequently breaks the surface of Turkish political life. In this atmosphere, radicalism and the more irresponsible brands of populism are at an advantage, and concern for Turkey's future is not misplaced. However, there are many strains of radicalism in contemporary Turkish politics–extremes of left, right, and even demagoguery of the center–and advocates of an Islamic order compete with many others for the allegiance of disaffected Turks. The Muslim ideal has not yet won the contest.

Certainly that ideal has an evident attraction. The Turks, some of them will say, entered history as Muslims. Their great achievement–the creation of the Ottoman state and empire–was an Islamic achievement. The Ottoman Islamic order was a satisfying one, a political and cultural triumph of the first magnitude; the revolutionary policies of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk and his successors failed to create a worthy substitute in the democratic, secular, and "etatistic" Republican Turkey, now a pauper-state and fourth-rate power. The

Turcica promoted by the state is an artificial legacy; only Islam can restore a lost sense of purpose to Turkey adrift.

Nostalgia for *Müsluman Türkiye* responds to stirring symbols. The Ottoman flag is one; for many years after the establishment of the Republic, the banner's display was an unmistakable mark of defiance. Architectural remains have deeper associations. When a vice-premier (Erbakan) from a pro-Islamic coalition party chose the Topkapi Sarayi as the site for his address on the 53rd anniversary of the Republic (1976), this too was an act of defiance. He said he had chosen the Ottoman palace "because of its symbolism." There is an even more defiant example from May 1976, when students entered Aya Sofia to conduct Friday prayer in that great former mosque, now a renowned museum. Reminders of Ottoman Islamic civilization remain an inescapable problem; despite the moves to a Latin alphabet, a recast language, and new institutions, laws, and customs, an Ottoman past still poses a vigorous challenge to a Turkish present.

For years, that challenge was clandestine. Attaturk tolerated no opposition to his policy of secularization and Westernization; opponents were often driven to revolt. The most notable rebellions took place in 1925-6 and 1930, and many of the participants were executed. It was not until Attaturk's death and the emergence of a two-party system that Islam began to figure again in Turkish politics. The Turkish constitution states that "no person shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings or things considered sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of political or personal benefit, or for gaining power . . ." But the two rival parties both began to appreciate the political benefits that accrued from inclusion of Islamic planks in their platforms. The Democratic party under Adnan Menderes and its successor, the Justice party under Suleyman Demirel, were especially associated with appealing to Islamic sentiment. The Democratic party, after its victory in the 1950 elections, took the first step by permitting the *ezan* (the call to prayer)

to be chanted once again in Arabic (Attaturk had insisted upon Turkish), and allowed radio recitations from the Quran, so popular in other Middle Eastern countries, and previously banned in Turkey. Groups which, in the words of the constitution, advocated "basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious dogmas" were, however, still harassed during the 1950s and 1960s. Religious brotherhoods like the *Ticaniyya* were suppressed; *Nurculuk*, or Nurism (after Said Nursi, a figure who had roughly the same opinions and prejudices as does Khumayni) was also stifled, and Nurists were tried and imprisoned (see Ahmad, 1977; Landau, 1974).

By the 1970s, however, the prohibition against openly anti-secular movements lapsed completely as Turkish politics were further democratized. For the first time there emerged what one might justifiably call an Islamic political party: the National Salvation Party (NSP)–*Milli Selamet Partisi*–under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The policy of Erbakan's party constitutes a retreat from secularism. In the National Assembly the NSP has advocated the partial banning of alcohol consumption in public places, prosecution for defamation of Islam, the reintroduction of religious instruction in public schools in the guise of "ethics courses," and a series of similar measures. Erbakan has said that the shari'a can again meet Turkey's legal requirements–an outspoken challenge to the constitution.

Yet the NSP is distinctive. It is not led by ulama but by technocrats. Necmettin Erbakan himself was a professor of engineering at Istanbul Technical University; his leadership reflects the total disestablishment of the Turkish ulama. The NSP also accepts the fundamental premises of the democratic system and has played both the role of loyal opposition party and coalition partner. From February to September 1974 Erbakan had even forged a coalition with the Kemalists of the Republican People's Party. The NSP, then, is not a revolutionary party.

The NSP is even more distinctive in another respect. Between the years 1973 and 1977, supposedly a period of Muslim "revival," the NSP's popularity diminished. The party captured 11.8 percent of the popular vote in 1973 and only 8.6 percent in 1977. This decline is even more remarkable in light of the brief resurgence of the Islamic idiom in Turkey during the Cyprus war of 1974, a conflict from which the NSP might have benefitted.

This is not to say that Erbakan's party is the sole voice of Muslim political aspirations in Turkey. Suleyman Demirel's Justice party also uses the religious appeal: Demirel's government hosted an Islamic conference of foreign ministers in Istanbul in 1976, and Demirel himself conspicuously kissed the Quran before many of his public speeches during the 1977 electoral campaign. The Justice party, however, still represents a current in mainstream politics and Demirel's Islamic program is more a series of limited concessions. On the other edge of the NSP are Muslim groups of decidedly Nurist character; the extent of their popularity is unknown but they probably enjoy a rather narrow base of support in the cities, a base somewhat broader in the smaller towns and countryside.

Given the electoral embarrassment of the NSP, Turkish advocates of an Islamic order do not seem to proceed from a position of strength. In Turkey, there is at least that yardstick so absent elsewhere in Asia and Africa; to say that political Islam holds an attraction for 15 percent of Turkish voters would be generous. A fundamental secularism informs not only the two major parties, but the many radical streams of right and left. Only if these ideologies (and the armed forces) were to exhaust themselves in a protracted confrontation would the Islamic alternative have an opportunity to fill a vacuum. Despite Turkey's troubles, that possibility remains a distant one.

Pakistan

Pakistan is an Islamic republic. Perhaps there, as nowhere else, Muslims have asked themselves what must be done to achieve an order that reconciles the demands of faith and modernity. This quest was to have been a great experiment: committed Muslims joined together, agreed that fulfillment as Muslims was impossible were they to live as a tolerated minority in a predominantly Hindu polity, and so advocated their own state—a Muslim state. Here they were to live by choice as Muslims in harmony with God's design; others would learn from their example.

Pakistan was not to be a community of men and women of single-minded purpose, however. By force of circumstance, Pakistan became a country of refugees, burdened by the problems that face those states constituted of amorphous and uprooted populations. The republic was Islamic, but there was no consensus on content. Others have written at great length about the attempts to find common ground: the committees, commissions, and constitutions that followed one upon the other in rapid succession. These repeated attempts failed to reconcile the fundamentalist aspirations of some with the reformist and even secularist principles of others; and as Pakistani politics were increasingly punctuated by military intervention, the Islamic question took a back seat to the debate over the viability of democracy and political pluralism.

The last interlude of that democracy in Pakistan saw Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) triumphant. Bhutto made the obeisance to Islam expected of every Pakistani premier, particularly in his conduct of foreign policy, but his party's orientation was heavily reformist, leaning almost toward secularism in many aspects of domestic policy. To his rivals in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of Islampasand parties, the state under Bhutto was but a sorry shadow of an Islamic order. The fundamentalist *Jamiat-i Islami,* at the forefront of the PNA,

was among the government's harshest critics. The society's leader, Abu'l Ala al-Mawdudi, is a prolific author whose published views coincide with Khumayni's on virtually every significant point of Islamic political theory. Following their own electoral disappointment, the parties of the PNA took to the streets directly from the mosques, precipitating the 1977 violence that led to Bhutto's fall and the martial law administration—the coup—of General Zia ul-Haq.

Zia ul-Haq's sympathies lie with the Islamic parties; he has distributed ministries among them and has made 1979 the year for the long-delayed implementation of shari'a provisions, particularly hudud. Advocates of an Islamic order of Mawdudi design have never had a better opportunity to see their vision fulfilled. For Zia ul-Haq has little claim to legitimacy—even in his allegedly transitional caretaker role—other than his support of this vision. It was he, say his allies, who gave meaning to the phrase "Islamic republic" where others had so conspicuously failed.

Whether this Islamic order will outlast Zia ul-Haq is uncertain. Neither the execution of Bhutto nor the prospect of elections works to its advantage. The reaction to Zia ul-Haq is likely to engulf his collaborators and their programs, and the complaints about Mawdudi, prohibition, the floggings and public executions are already quite audible. The Islamic alternative has a substantial and militant following, but the current legal transformation of Pakistan is directly indebted to Zia ul-Haq and may well require a similar regime to preserve it.

Soviet Union

Iran's revolution has once again stirred speculation about the mood of nearly 45 million Muslims living in the Soviet Union's Asian republics. The reassertion of Islam in the states bordering the Soviet Union might awaken Soviet Muslims;

the Soviet empire might face a sudden challenge from these once docile quarters, from a portion of the population bound for an increasingly important role in Soviet affairs by mere virtue of its rapid demographic growth.

In his 1964 study of Soviet Central Asia, Geoffrey Wheeler touches upon this tendancy of Western observers to look eagerly for fissures within the Soviet polity. Regarding Soviet Central Asia, however, he notes: "Of the existence even in embryo of nationalist movements of the kind experienced in other empires, there are few if any characteristic signs." Religious observance is "still very much alive. In spite of the closing of mosques, the secularization of education and the steady stream of atheist propaganda, the vast majority of Central Asians would readily admit to being Muslims, and many if not most would strongly resent any suggestion that they were not." However, "the existence of nationalism in Central Asia cannot be finally proved or disproved." That remains as accurate an appraisal as the evidence allows.

Religious observance does survive, and visitors from abroad can see the functioning mosques. Unsanctioned rites continue as well; this is evident from complaints in the press concerning them. Said Ashkhabad's *Turkmenskaya Iskra* in March 1978:

> Gambling on an erroneous identification in the minds of some people of nationalist and religious feeling, Muslim priests and their myrmidons are attempting to pass off religious rituals and ceremonies as popular ones. The funeral rites in the Kunya-Urgenschskiy and Kalininskiy rayons are frequently of an openly religious nature. Vestiges with respect to women live on. Overcoming them is our primary task (JPRS, 71186).

There are enough articles of this sort (cf. JPRS, 69643, 70811) to indicate that even folk religion persists, although it is doubtful whether such practices are anywhere in revival. Nor is political dissidence unknown. To cite only the most recent instance, some 200 Crimean Tatars travelled to Mos-

cow to petition for their return to Crimea, from whence they were deported to Central Asia during the last world war; the protesters were reportedly rounded up by police and soldiers and sent back to Central Asia (Guardian, March 21, 1979). At the time of this writing, a noted Tatar activist is on trial at Tashkent (Le Monde, August 9, 1979, according to André Sakharov).

This sort of evidence, however, seems much diminished in stature alongside Soviet confidence. If Soviet officials were concerned about the possible side-effects of Iran's revolution in their own territories, they certainly did not betray that concern. They encouraged Iran's opposition to the Shah and, after a period of indecision, recognized Khumayni's leadership; they must have been quite certain that the potential gains in Iran outweighed any risk to security in Central Asia. For the Soviets believe that their Muslims, though directly across the border from Islamic revolution in Iran and jihad in Afghanistan, are different.

Soviet Muslims are different, an official might say, because they have been severed from the world of Islam for nearly 60 years. Their languages have been altered to bear little resemblance to the languages of the Muslim mainstream. There is little movement across the Soviet frontier; thus political winds from neighboring Muslim countries are shut out. In the absence of outside influences, atheistic propaganda enjoys a virtual monopoly. Another March 1978 item reports from Ashkhabad:

> Special atheist clubs and atheist halls have appeared and schools of atheism and people's universities are operating. The republic's newspapers and journals have opened special sections on scientific atheism, and radio and television are transmitting interesting broadcasts on these themes. Special movie sketches are being put out. But the main thing is individual work with believers. As a result there has been a marked weakening in a number of rayons in the positions of the Muslim priesthood, a reduction in pilgrimages to so-called 'holy places,' and a dimunition in the priesthood's influence in the day-to-day life of the population (JPRS, 71201).

At the same time, the heritage of these peoples is not wholly negated; "national" customs, languages, and folklore are encouraged, preserved as officially-sanctioned expressions of regional identity and pride. Overtly religious expression is denied however; ulama have been nationalized; Islamic scholarship has withered; and religious observance is so infrequent that many have completely forgotten the rhythm of Muslim life, the procedure in prayer, and the conduct of holidays. Even mosques have been totally transformed; few still serve as places of worship.

The next element in the isolation of Soviet Muslims was the introduction of European settlers (mainly Russian and Ukranian) who constitute a considerable proportion of the population in several Central Asian republics; all but Turkmenistan showed a drop between 1926 and 1959 in the percentage of their populations of local "nationality," despite higher Muslim fertility rates. Because of the European presence, the intense program of Sovietization, and large amounts of aid and subsidies, Soviet Muslims enjoy greater agricultural and industrial prosperity than the people of any neighboring Muslim state, as well as a higher rate of literacy and a wider diffusion of modern skills. Then there is the final arbiter: state power. The state has not hesitated to strike at those who are disloyal to the regime, and did so convincingly during World War II when several Muslim communities were accused of collaboration with advancing German forces. The Soviet government believes that it has mastered the fine art of governing Muslims through a carefully balanced policy of carrot and stick.

Few legacies are so remote as to be beyond retrieval, and under certain circumstances, Soviet Muslims might be given to yearnings for an earlier era before they forfeited their independence and fell into the orbit of a multinational empire. But will must be coupled with opportunity, and the Soviet state is neither weakened nor distracted. If anything, opportunities are diminishing with the consolidation of Soviet power.

Egypt

"Brothers and sisters," Anwar al-Sadat once acknowledged in a speech before the Arab Socialist Union, "after the crushing defeat we suffered [in 1967] . . . it was natural that there would be a reaction, represented in a truthful, sincere and enthusiastic zeal for a religion" (FBIS/ME, September 29, 1977). There are two bits of evidence in this remark: Egypt is experiencing a return to faith, and Sadat clearly knows about it.

Because he knows, because he has taken the national pulse far better than did an aloof, isolated, and imperial Shah, Sadat has developed a subtle policy designed to direct Muslim sentiment down useful or harmless avenues.

The first principle is self-evident: Sadat is the "believing President." The Shah used to speak of his mysticism, and even Taraki prayed in public, but none has displayed piety as convincingly as Sadat. Among the original Free Officers, he was the most concerned with Islamic affairs; he maintained their famous liaison with the Muslim Brotherhood; he was later entrusted by Nasir to supervise the regime's abortive pan-Islamic venture of the 1950s; and he was sent to the Islamic Summit in Rabat in 1969 when Nasir pleaded ill health. In moments of crisis or on the eve of decisions (as in 1973 and again in November 1977) Sadat makes known his reliance upon God. Egyptians, even his critics, think him sincere. They saw nothing contrived in his professed desire to pray at Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem, at the time of his first journey to Israel.

The second principle maintains that the state will provide for the people's spiritual needs. Iran's believers were guided from Qum, a nearly autonomous city resentful of the capital; Egypt's Muslims turn principally to Cairo's al-Azhar, an appendage of the state. The Ministry of al-Azhar Affairs stands squarely in Cairo's Garden City amid the other government ministries. The ulama were overcome by the state in the

nineteeth century and, with few exceptions, have functioned as civil servants ever since. They are given ample means to encourage religious observance: they control sizeable budgets, enjoy large blocks of time on state radio, write newspaper columns, and draw upon publishing subsidies. In turn, they give eloquent expression to the political steps of the "believing President." In the most recent instance, the *Mufti* of Egypt issued a lengthy *bayan* (proclamation) stating that the peace agreement with Israel was in harmony with the principles of the Quran and the *sunna* of the Prophet (Al-Ahram, June 14, 1979). In response to political winds, ulama set the prevaling tenor of Islam: whether bellicose (as in 1973) or in line with the "faith of Peace" now so assiduously promoted.

Devout Sadat, with the support of state-employed ulama, provides a buffer to charges of apostasy fueled by the peace initiative and the discontent that springs from social and economic ills. The reassertion of Muslim sentiment has been managed by the regime with considerable success. Sadat's amnesty for Said Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood leader who was persona non grata under Nasir, and the permission granted the Muslim Brethren to resume open activity, are notable examples of this willingness to accommodate the public mood. Still, one cannot pass over several setbacks tied to the recent emergence of Islamic groups outside the organized and sanctioned framework.

Perhaps the most dramatic failure occurred with the July 1977 kidnap-murder of the distinguished religious scholar and former Minister of Awqaf and al-Azhar Affairs, Husayn al-Dhahabi. The crime was perpetrated by a small group that became popularly known as the society of *al-Takfir w'al-Higra.* Led by an obscure engineer, the society's program constituted an absolute rejection of the "heretical" state and

all its institutions; according to a member, its leader advocated:

> the repudiation of the social system, ruling and ruled, for its insistence on committing sins, the banning of instruction in state schools because the state is heretical and its programs are irreligious, and the banning of work in the Egyptian government organizations and public offices on the ground that the government is heretical and cooperates with usury. . . . all the *imams* of the mosques are heretics under whom it is not lawful to pray, so that it is necessary to remove [oneself] to a place where there is no authority of man over man, where they will worship God and prepare themselves physically and religiously and then march against the heretical society to change its system by force (JPRS, 69573).

Their victim had apparently attacked the sect in a publication; the society had sued him and several newspapers for libel, but then judged him a "heretic" and decided against awaiting the verdict of the "heretical" state. By this demonstration, said the kidnap note, the society intended to make the "infidels" aware that "the men of Islam are still well and that the rightful group is still present, that this group will continue to be present despite those who oppose and betray it and until God's will is done" (JPRS, 69747). Five members, including the society's leader, were hanged for the murder in March 1978.

The existence of one such society would not have caused much distress (and in fact there had been earlier and more violent incidents such as the attack on the military academy in Heliopolis in April 1974); but the drama of the kidnap-murder and the spate of bombings that followed focused attention on the proliferation of other groups, particularly on campuses, that saw the state with similar contempt. These societies and "ethical associations" were composed of students in Egypt's massive public universities, the youth in the "popular" quarters of Cairo away from the river where fulfillment is so distant from promise, and in the provincial cities

and towns. There were undirected Islamic currents; the government was concerned perhaps for the first time since Nasir's silencing of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Some blamed religious authorities. The chief military prosecutor said that al-Takfir w'al-Higra had exploited a religious vacuum and "that vacuum must be filled by the Islamic men of religion in al-Azhar or the Awqaf Ministry" (FBIS/ME, July 13, 1977). An official at that ministry was reported to have shouted (within earshot of reporters):

> I say before God and my conscience: we are the ones who are responsible. What are we doing about our erring young people? What are the Ministry of Awqaf and the Ministry of Propaganda doing? Nothing! Nothing! . . . This ministry is doing nothing but receiving guests and bidding farewell to them. This ministry is a regular reception hall (JPRS, 69573).

Sadat himself explained these "deviations" as a reaction to materialism compounded by the failure of Islamic education (FBIS/ME, October 20, 1977). The government, too, came under criticism, and reacted with (short-lived) proposals to reinstate shari'a provisions. For a while it seemed that the regime might attempt to bolster its image with further concessions to advocates of an Islamic order, but authorities regained sufficient confidence to allow these proposals to lapse.

A second source of breakdown has been the Coptic question. Heightened Muslim self-awareness has been paralleled by an awakening within the Coptic minority, a combination that led to some serious confessional incidents in 1971-72 and 1977. Sadat's policy is one of "national unity" and the ulama have been made to portray attacks on the Copts as deviations from Islam. From the perspective of Muslims who wish to restore the privileges accorded Muslims alone in the traditional Islamic order, it is Sadat's policy that is errant. Most recently, a Coptic church of great historical value was destroyed under suspicious circumstances in Cairo (Le Monde,

March 25-26, 1979). While this and similar acts are doubtless the work of small groups, they evidence the failure of the regime to control all religious manifestations.

Perhaps the most serious form of Muslim antiregime expression has addressed the peace initiative. The near-riot prompted by Muslim activists at Asyut in March 1979 was but a foretoken in some opinions. It is here that Sadat has tested his *Islampolitik*. It is impossible to say where that policy's limits lie, and it would be premature to say that he has overreached himself. To his advantage is his sensitivity to political and social crosswinds and the fact that he, and not his opponents, has mastered the technique of surprise and manipulation. The ulama and mosques are his; universities and schools, where the Muslim opposition is most at home, are under careful scrutiny. For that opposition to break out of encirclement, the many expectations raised by Sadat will have to be sorely unrealized, and then there will be many oppositions striving to pick up the pieces.

Syria

Syria, once an example of post-colonial instability, has now known nearly a decade of continuous rule by President Hafiz al-Asad and his Baath Party. It is a remarkable achievement, unprecedented in the modern history of Syria. And yet few regimes are so vulnerable to the Muslim appeal; the foundation of Asad's rule is constant vigilance.

Asad and many of his lieutenants hail from a religious minority. The Alawis, centered in Latakia in western Syria, are an underdeveloped community that constitutes roughly 11 percent of Syria's population. Like many other provincial Syrian minorities after World War I, the Alawis had been encouraged by the French to press for separate statehood, and at several points Alawis did resist integration into the Syrian state. Eventually they gave up any separatist ambi-

tions, but they were not to be ruled by others. Their rise to disproportionate power in the unified Syrian state is a result of their primacy in the armed forces, to which they flocked (earlier with French encouragement) in order to escape the dead end of a depressed and static community. As Syrian politics increasingly fell within the military domain, the Alawi quest for upward mobility was richly rewarded: Alawis stand at the summit of the Syrian political structure.

This sudden and unanticipated rise bred resentment. For at the forefront of the struggle for independence had been the Sunni Muslims populating the major cities of Syria's heartland. They had enjoyed the preference accorded Sunnis under Sunni Ottoman rule; they had fought for greater privileges in the Arab Revolt; they resisted the French; they, along with Syrian Christian intellectuals, had developed the guiding principles of Arab nationalism; and they had stepped into positions of authority with the departure of the French. Then – following a series of coups d'etat – Sunnis found themselves on the political doorstep as the prime qualification for political leadership became military rank.

The injustice in Sunni eyes was compounded by the fact that Alawis had emerged on top after the bloodletting had ended. Syria's Sunni ulama had considered the Alawis heretical, beyond the Muslim pale; Alawi beliefs and doctrines were ridiculed, and were no more than tolerated under Ottoman rule. This should not have mattered: Sunni Arab nationalists had long avowed their secularism. That avowal, however, was at least partially a device to reconcile others to Sunni rule, while now it was being used to reconcile Sunnis to the rule of others. Enough Sunnis had identified their nationalist aspirations with their Islam and confused Syrian independence with the rule of their own community to leave a bitter taste of disappointment with this ironic turn of events.

These are the sorts of prejudices with which Asad has had to cope. His predecessors in power faced Sunni disturbances during the 1960s, but Asad hoped to avoid the same prob-

lems by adhering to a judicious Muslim policy. Despite his own secularist disposition, Asad made public displays of piety: he prayed at a major Sunni mosque in Latakia, where he kissed the Quran; his portrait was inserted in a government edition of the Quran (the famous "Asad Quran"); he trekked to the Lahore Islamic Summit in 1974 where he publicly prayed alongside the other Muslim heads-of-state; and he made the pilgrimage. The Alawis, too, were rehabilitated. The regime circulated theological tracts which declared that Alawis constituted an integral segment of the Islamic community. Since the more ecumenical Sunni ulama recognize Shi'is to be Muslims, the regime went to the trouble of having a notable Shi'i dignitary in Lebanon declare that the Alawi faith was, in fact, a branch of the Shi'a. Finally, Asad took pains to assure Sunnis of ministerial portfolios and positions in the civil bureaucracy.

This did not, however, prevent a recurrence of the violence that plagued Asad's predecessors. The Sunni merchants in the bazaars of Damascus, Aleppo, Hamah, and Homs were being made to feel the pinch of socialist policies; they found spokesmen in those Sunni ulama who remained independent of state control, in an alliance not unlike that in Iran. Their resentment was touched off in January 1973 when the government released the text of a new draft constitution that omitted the customary article prescribing Islam as the religion of state—almost certainly a triumph for secularist ideologues in inner-Baathist circles. A group of Sunni ulama proclaimed, however, that the new constitution wiped out 14 centuries during which Syria had been the pride of Islam, a theme that they repeated in the mosques. Asad could not retreat—he might have caused too much ill-feeling within the Party—but he did attempt to reach a compromise by proposing that the new constitution require a president of the Muslim faith. In accord with this decision, a public referendum was scheduled on the proposed amendment. But the situation actually deteriorated after Asad's offer: at issue was not the constitution, but Alawi primacy.

The parallels with Iran's violence are striking. The uprising—"a crisis that shook the regime almost to its foundations," according to Abbas Kelidar—began in the urban mosques with sermons by ulama. The congregations moved from the mosques to the streets. Clashes with police led to exchanges of gunfire, leaving casualties in both ranks. Baath offices (like those of the official *Rastakhiz* party in Iran) became the target of attacks. The merchants shut their shops in general strikes that affected Hamah, Homs, and Aleppo; in Damascus, a general strike was averted only by last-minute intervention of ulama. The principal shari'a court judge was arrested for advocating a boycott of the referendum; the Shari'a Judicial Council went on strike in protest. Aleppo College went on strike; Syrian soldiers took the campus and, evoking a charge that later often reverberated in Iran, were rumored to have shaved the beards of arrested theology students before sending them to prison. Slogans proliferated on public buildings: "Islam is the road to victory," "religion to God is Islam," and "Islam is our constitution." The uprising ended only with the despatch of armoured units into the cities.

In subsequent years, Asad was far more cautious, and his opponents were driven underground. They began a campaign of assassination directed against Alawi officials and officers, in streets and homes. In June 1979 this campaign reached new heights: a Muslim group engineered an attack on a military school in Aleppo, killing over 60 officers, the great majority of whom were almost certainly Alawis. Asad responded with a spate of executions -not of the perpetrators, but of those convicted of similarly-motivated offenses on earlier occasions. The shift to this kind of operation by Sunni recalcitrants is almost certainly a sign of weakness; it is difficult to imagine any Syrian regime being brought down by terrorism, but the Muslim opposition has managed to create an atmosphere of public insecurity that may embolden others better poised to act.

In any case, the Sunni-Alawi issue has already had a telling effect upon the government's policy. Eager for wider acceptance, Asad has sought consensus through the Arab nationalist war with Israel. The military ability of the Alawis is their political mandate, and in moments of crisis the regime issues appropriate reminders. In 1967, before Asad's rise to power, his Alawi predecessor (Salah Jadid) had distracted Syrians from a similar spate of internal violence by aerial duels with Israel which charged the atmosphere for the subsequent June war. In 1973, semi-official Syrian sources announced that the Sunni riots were coming at a time when the Israelis were planning a "new aggression" (FBIS/ME, February 27, 1973). In 1979, the attack on the Aleppo school was quickly followed by the Syrian airforce's unsuccessful intervention in an Israeli air raid over Lebanon. The need for this sort of outlet and the pursuit of legitimacy through military achievement have sustained Asad, but have kept Syria out of the "peace process." Without the conflict with Israel, Asad would be forced to emphasize even further a secular Arab nationalism that remains compelling for many Syrians but leaves a permanent pocket of violent dissent. In Syria, for an Alawi amid Sunnis, Islam remains a rigid constraint, a source of legitimacy upon which Asad cannot draw. He must continue to turn elsewhere.

The Palestinians and Lebanon

In January 1979, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan warned Palestinians not to get "carried away with the wave of the fanatic Islamic mood that's going around," and added that "they have to realize that they might pay very, very dearly for that" (BBC/ME, January 25, 1979). A short time later, the Voice of Palestine broadcast a message from Yasir Arafat to Khumayni:

> The huge revolutionary torch radiating from struggler Iran these days, when we are celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muham-

> mad, will light the sky of our dear and beloved homeland, Palestine, and the sky of our Islamic nation, thus enveloping the entire region with the light of this sacred flame and illuminating the path of *jihad*. . . . This proves that the glorious Islamic nation will definitely triumph over all its enemies—the imperialists, colonialists, and Zionists. Our return to Holy Jerusalem has become near, God willing (BBC/ME, February 13, 1979).

Arafat may have since had his differences with Khumayni, but the question remains: Does the notion of an Islamic order have a place in the Palestinian resistance?

The PLO is committed on paper to the creation of a secular state; before the wider non-Muslim world, Palestinians insist that the conflict with Israel is political and not religious. But to other Muslims, they have enjoined jihad as "Abu Hisham" did in Cairo before assembed ulama in 1968 (Al-Ahram, October 6, 1968), and have negated the distinction between religion and politics. This might be dismissed as opportunism, no more than an attempt to widen support for the Palestinian cause by exploiting the "sentimental" weaknesses of others. But cannot the same thing be said of the slogan of a "secular, democratic state"?

Khumayni recognized the value of silence when Iran's revolution became feasible; he would not show his hand before victory. The Palestinians have achieved the same effect of ambiguity by adhering to irreconcilable principles; contradictions abound within their "program." As in Iran, supporters and sympathizers are encouraged to interpret the movement in whatever way suits them as long as they render aid and succor. In fact, the Palestinians, and particularly the PLO, have provided few clues to their vision of the future. The role of Islam in the current movement and in the anticipated future polity remains elusive; to commit themselves might be unwise at this stage.

So the Palestinian resistance speaks in many languages; in which is it most fluent? When they first found their national voice, in the twenties and thirties, much of their expression was Islamic. Their leaders were often men with religious

titles–foremost among them, a mufti–and they followed the familiar course from the mosques to the streets. Muslim festivals were times of particular unrest; the defense of Muslim holy places was the backdrop to the severest confrontations. There were certainly other issues, other spokesmen, other forms of nationalist expression among Muslims and certainly among Christian Palestinians. But Palestine had been an Ottoman province, solidly dar al-islam; Palestine's Muslims had shared in that great venture as Muslims. They, too, enjoyed primacy under an Ottoman order expressly Islamic, and that legacy was not hastily shed.

Nevertheless, the Palestinian experience is, in many respects, unique. Their collective failure was absolute; the leadership and rhetoric that so sorely disappointed them was discredited, dismissed as "reactionary." New ideologies flourished, among them some of the most revolutionary in the Middle East. For Palestinian ideas were being fashioned in response to those of the Zionist adversary. Like the Zionists, they too would have to break with a traditional past, a religious legacy scarred by humiliation, and find new sources of inspiration.

Some found that inspiration in a blend of Marxism and Arab nationalism, in organizations like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by a nominal Christian, Dr. George Habash. These were the kinds of esoteric political strains attacked by a 1969 Islamic gathering in Mecca which, while supporting the Palestinian cause, complained that "its ranks have been penetrated by imported ideas and suspect doctrines which do not profess belief in God and do not draw from the Islamic faith's sources of spiritual strength" (Al-Bilad, November 7, 1969). In contrast, the PLO mainstream–particularly al-Fath–represents a more traditional type of Arab nationalism in which Islam is accorded the usual deference. This centrist faction is particularly well disposed to the historical comparison of the Palestinian resistance to past Islamic struggles: guerilla units are named after great battles

waged against unbelievers long ago, and the Zionist-Crusader analogy is periodically pursued. Arafat, however, combines personal exhibitions of Muslim piety with exhortations to "national unity" among Christians and Muslims, much as Sadat does. The war against the Jews has excited a Muslim sense of destiny, as Arafat's remark reveals, but it has also simultaneously drawn Christian and Muslim Palestinian together under the banner of parochial Palestinian nationalism and Arabism. Events in distant Iran cannot reverse this process of consolidation underway in the West Bank, Lebanon, and elsewhere. The idea of Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, that "the religious fanaticism unleashed in Iran could spread to Moslem Jerusalem and the West Bank, introducing a lethal element not yet felt in that tortured land," is itself an alarmist and provocative statement (IHT, February 17-18, 1979).

Yet if the Palestinians are a people forged by opposition to powerful foes, is it not possible that they, too, might return to primordial allegiances once success is achieved? The "democratic, secular state" is an integral part of a program that anticipates but one state in Palestine for Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Reality, at best, will afford no more than a West Bank/Gaza state with a predominantly Muslim population, heavily dependent on Muslim neighbors. It is here that the *Islamproblem* will make itself felt, as it must whenever constitutions are written, law is enforced, and foreign policy is made.

Independent Lebanon, it is already clear, has been unable to sustain secularism or democracy. Muammar al-Qaddhafi said of the Lebanese civil war in October 1978:

> The world is ashamed to say that there is a religious war going on. . . . Today, Israeli warships are bombarding west Beirut, whose inhabitants are Muslims, in order to protect the Christians who are in eastern Beirut. The harbor of Juniyah is being protected at this hour by the Israeli Navy so that weapons from the United States and the Israelis can reach the Christians in Leb-

> anon, who are fighting against the Muslims. This is a religious war. This is a crusade. In short, the Jews and the Christians are in alliance against the Muslims (FBIS/ME, October 11, 1978).

Despite the vocabulary of right-versus-left, progressives pitted against conservatives, haves arrayed against have-nots, who has not sometimes felt that the Lebanese war really came down to a confessional blood feud? Who could overlook the "identity-card murders," in which men and women were spared or executed after a check of "confession" as recorded on their Lebanese identity cards? How was one to interpret the assaults on mosques and churches, and the willful destruction of holy books? How could one explain the explosive effect of the most trivial disputes, of arguments over traffic accidents? What of the involvement in the conflict of individuals like the (now-missing) Shi'i imam Musa Sadr, or religious institutions like the Maronite *Ordre des Moines*? And what of the Maronite-Israeli alliance, the joining of two parties quite sure that their opponents wished to impose upon them a subordinate role in a traditional Islamic order? The scars of sectarian strife on the map of Lebanon are there for all to see: the Maronites have carved for themselves a territorial enclave and the Christians of South Lebanon under their Major Haddad seek to do the same.

Nonetheless, so many Lebanese Muslims have maintained that theirs is not a sectarian war. Lebanon, they note, had bestowed privilege, political and economic, upon a few while denying the most fundamental rights and dignities to others. That disproportionate privilege was embodied in the National Pact. The war represented a struggle over whether power and wealth would be divided anew, more equitably than in the past. The privileged had sought to preserve their position by detaching Lebanon from Arab regional politics, an unnatural divorce. The war was fought to draw Lebanon back to its responsibilities as an Arab state.

So complex a conflict cannot be reduced to one dimension. In Lebanon, socio-economic conflicts overlap sectarian differences, so that motive is indistinguishable from faith. Lebanese Muslims deny sectarian motives because the Lebanese political tradition forbade confessional agitation, a prohibition enshrined in law; this prohibition decided acceptable forms of expression well before the civil war. The involvement of outside factions—the Palestinians, Syrians, Israelis, Libyans, and Saudis—has further clouded the interpretative picture. There were, undoubtedly, periods of conflict and geographic sectors in the theatre of war in which the sectarian dimension was magnified. To define these periods and places and to assess their importance in the wider war will require careful study of each piece of this fractured polity. There is no point in anticipating these studies; one can only stress now that any approach that fails to detect the confrontation between Christians and Muslims will be incomplete, and any approach that does not on occasion emphasize that confrontation is defective.

Iraq

The Shi'a, Ayatullah Shariatmadari once said, "share one thing in common, namely deprivation and oppression. In Iraq, the Shi'a amount to 72 percent of the country's population. However, they have no impact compatible with their percentage. This is nothing new to them because this was the situation even before the Baath Party assumed power in Iraq" (JPRS, 71660). Aside from the numerical exaggeration (Shi'is probably constitute 50 percent of Iraq's population), Shariatmadari accurately summarized the Muslim dilemma in Iraqi politics: the regimes in Baghdad have always been heavily Sunni and have not satisfied Shi'is demands for greater participation.

Shi'i Iraq has always represented underdeveloped and inarticulate Iraq, a section of the population little touched by new ideologies and closely tied to faith. In Iraq are to be found the principal Shi'i holy cities; it is here that Khumayni found sanctuary and support after his exile from Iran and here that he lectured on his own brand of political theory for some 15 years. That such a community should formulate grievances in Islamic terms and turn to ayatullahs for leadership evidences the continuum in Shi'i Iraqi society.

The history of Shi'i disturbances in Iraq is a long one; it suffices merely to note that they persist under the regime of Saddam Husayn. In February 1977, according to the Iraqi Interior Ministry, a "treacherous hired gang" infiltrated an *Ashura* procession from Najaf to Karbala; these "agents" shouted slogans against the government and raised "suspicious" placards "with planning and guidance of the imperialist and Zionist circles." They were warned but persisted in their "suspicious plot" and were arrested (FBIS/ME, February 10, 1977). There had been some "indiscriminate shooting" at a point along the way, involving at least one death (ARR/77/75). A short time later, an "agent of the Syrian regime" was arrested at the shrine of al-Husayn in Karbala with a suitcase full of explosives.

Through the mist of these official statements, it is apparent that the pilgrims' procession turned into an antigovernment demonstration that resulted in a clash with police; according to other sources, Karbala was swept by 2 days of demonstrations before the entry of tanks, and Shi'i sources not surprisingly spoke of hundreds of casualties (Guardian, March 1, 1977). It is quite certain that religious dignitaries were detained on this occasion, and a special tribunal sentenced eight individuals to death. There was speculation that these sentences were considered too lenient by Saddam Husayn, because two ministers who served on the tribunal were purged shortly thereafter.

During 1978, the government was faced with a further dilemma: Khumayni. He was placed under house arrest in

Najaf, and Iraqi institutions in Iran briefly became a target of demonstrators until Khumayni moved on to France. In the meantime, the religious idiom apparently began to taint the ruling party. Said Saddam Husayn on June 6, 1978:

> Our party is not neutral when it comes to atheism or religious beliefs; it always favors religious beliefs. However, our party is not a religious party and must not become one. . . . What is required of us is to prevent religion from being used as a weapon by the State and in society. . . . We must be proud of religion as such without attaching politics to it. . . . While we reject atheism, we must not become men of religion in our dealing with this subject; we must not transform state institutions into organs with the task of performing religious rites and traditional religious duties. A policy of interfering in religious affairs will lead to the division of our people not only into believers and non-believers, but to divisions among the believers themselves because of the differences in their religious doctrines (BBC/ME, 5834).

The rise of Khumayni to power in Iran, however, has set back this drive for "national unity." June 1979 again saw violent confrontations in Najaf between demonstrators and police, and similar incidents were reported from Karbala and Basrah. Demonstrators demanded that the house arrest imposed upon Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a major Shi'i leader and reportedly a friend of Khumayni, be lifted. July 1979 witnessed a continuation of these demonstrations.

The significance of these disturbances is unclear. Saddam Hussayn and his allies are cautious and highly suspicious of all other political aspirants; their lengthy rules has broken the conventional Iraqi pattern. They have easily suppressed the demonstrations, just as they have smashed the far-better disciplined conspiracies of the left. The overt, provincial, and disorganized nature of the Shi'i opposition leaves it at a severe disadvantage against such a foe. The hopes entertained by the Shi'a in Iraq must then rest upon the sympathy of Khumayni and the new government in Iran. Until the Islamic revolution in Iran is consolidated, unified Shi'is will not be in

a position to test Iraq's regime as Iraq (through aid to Khuzistan's Arabs) has tested Iran's.

Saudi Arabia and Libya

No two states have pursued Muslim "authenticity" more avidly than these; they are accomplished Islamic orders. Accounts of the legal, political, economic, and social systems of these states are accessible and there is no need to summarize them here.

If in the previous sections, Islamic movements have appeared as forces of opposition or new and uncertain arrivals in positions of authority, in Saudi Arabia and Libya they represent the status quo. If elsewhere, Islam has emerged as a quest to restore a lost legacy, here it represents an attempt to preserve an authenticity never lost and only now threatened. If elsewhere, Muslim movements are sustained by the ethic of the basaar, the longings of a disintegrating countryside and urban flotsam, or the piety of ulama, here they draw from desert traditions of purity and insularity. If elsewhere, Muslim movements constitute a rejection of other rival nationalisms, here one finds a political Islam fully integrated with Arabism, so that the two concepts become ideologically indistinguishable. Also, if elsewhere, Muslim movements feed off conflicts with non-Muslims or Muslims of rival sects, Saudi Arabia and Libya are nearly homogeneous in the confessional domain.

It is appropriate to end these country sketches by citing wide contrasts; they evidence the tremendous variety within political Islam. Each species within this broad genus has seen a unique evolution, bound to the special circumstances of widely separated locales. Had our discussion been broadened to include parts of Muslim Black Africa and Southeast Asia—of equal interest but of lesser significance in the conduct of American policy—those unique features would have emerged

with even greater clarity. In the previous chapter, the existence of many Muslim ideals was discerned; the practice of political Islam presents no less overwhelming a kaleidoscope. The distinctive pattern that emerges is the lack of pattern.

IV. THE POLITICS OF MUSLIM SOLIDARITY

Is political Islam, so diffuse and divided, moving toward fusion? Abu'l-Kalam Azad offered the analogy of an Islamic world "connected by an electric wire"; Yazdi has spoken of Iran's movement as the "trigger" of a wider struggle. To believe that the Muslim world constitutes so organic a political unit is to contend that the variety within Muslim thought, motive, and opportunity surveyed here is insignificant. An informed diplomat projected that "Pan-Islamism is going to be one of the world-forces of the new era. Its danger from our point of view lies in the fact (a) that its promoters, whether themselves politicians or votaries, make their appeal to masses of people animated by some of the deepest religious conviction left in the world, and (b) that it propagates itself largely by agencies outside our ken and control; almost outside our comprehension."

That prediction was made by Andrew Ryan, a Briton with broad experience in the Muslim world who composed some of the best-informed despatches from Turkey and Arabia in the era between the two world wars. His words date from 1919; 60 years later they remain unfulfilled. Today the same prediction is being voiced again; is it more credible?

Ryan's world was one of pan-Islamic proclamations and reiterated Muslim claims to a unity of purpose. The Turks

were then the focus of this wired-up Islam. Those responsible for Ottoman foreign policy in the late nineteenth century believed that, were the European powers to regard the Sultan-Caliph as leader of a vast global following, the Ottoman state might earn greater respect from those who sought to devour it. Thus, the promotion of Ottoman primacy within the world of Islam became the foundation of Sultan Abdulhamit's attempt to inflate the image of his weary empire and disguise the debilitated state of the polity he ruled.

This campaign, continued by the Young Turks, had some effect. The autobiography of Muhammad Ali, Indian Muslim organizer and activist, brims with a now-forgotten kind of Turcophile sentiment:

> My feelings during the disastrous war in the Balkans (1912) were at one time so overpowering that I must confess, I even contemplated suicide.... The latest message from Reuter that had reached me [in Delhi] was that the Bulgarians were only twenty-five miles from the walls of Constantinople—Constantinople, a name that had for five centuries been sacred to every Muslim as the center of his highest hopes."

Such views led Lord Chelmsford, while Viceroy of India, to write in 1916 that "Indian Moslems are sentimentally and religiously more Ottoman than the Turks."

Muhammand Ali, however, spoke of his "feelings," and contemplated not action but abdication by suicide. Chelmsford spoke of "sentiment." These are rather distant from Ryan's "world-force," and Sir Harcourt Butler, in a 1916 letter to Lord Chelmsford, made precisely that distinction: "I have always maintained that pan-Islamism is a feeling and not a force. The Arab, the Turk, the Punjabi Muhammadan, the class that go to Aligarh and the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal have very little in common with each other and mostly despise each other." Yet, Ryan was swept up by the talk and emotion, and so made one of his few hopelessly errant forecasts. From Constantinople he addressed these

words to Gertrude Bell in Baghdad (1921): "I am one of those who see in political pan-Islamism, with the Young Turks as the Prophet of God, a steadily growing source of trouble, if not danger, in all the Islamic countries with which we have to do." Instead Attaturk decided that a niche on the periphery of Europe was preferable to a worthless primacy among the Muslims, and the danger disappeared.

Our era is not unlike Ryan's. Said Muhammad Sid-Ahmad, Egyptian political commentator: "The religious idiom has now become a salient mode of political expression throughout the region" (IHT, April 3, 1979). Iran is said to have returned to the fold; commented Libya's Jallud: "We are pleased for what we heard from the leader of the popular revolution in Iran, Ayatullah Khumayni, who said that the Gulf is an Islamic gulf. This is true. This is an Islamic gulf and not an Arab or Persian gulf, because we all fall under the banner of Islam" (BBC/ME, January 30, 1979). Turkey is being drawn back, Jallud again said, in a dinner for Ecevit:

> The latest events in Cyprus have revealed that in spite of Turkey's commitment to the West, the West had abandoned Turkey because it was a Muslim country.... [The Turks] have since tried to re-establish their Muslim character and advance relations with Muslims and Arabs instead of with the West and Western colonialism, which has been pressurizing the Turks (BBC/ME, January 30, 1979).

There are certainly numerous agencies for promoting this degree of unity, for translating nebulous sentiment into concrete action. There are new fora, such as Islamic conferences of states, for promoting exchanges of ideas and diplomatic accord. There is an Islamic Development Bank capitalized at $2 billion that serves as a funnel for oil revenues to less-developed Muslim economies. There are solidarity funds, missions, educational programs, secret and open grants, even plans for

military cooperation, a common market, and a commonwealth of Muslim states. Necmettin Erbakan, said enthusiastically during a visit to the Islamic Defense Institute in London that it would be possible to create the world's greatest power by raising Muslim cooperation to the most advanced level (BBC/ME, February 8, 1979).

Thus far the results achieved are much more modest. Conversion of some Black African heads of state to Islam, the resolutions of Islamic conferences, the increased sense of awareness, are now there. We have spoken of shared experience, shared sentiment, and shared idiom; but to believe that these are readily translated into unified action assumes a great deal, perhaps too much. Another "salient mode of expression" in the region is openly to profess brotherhood while conspiring against one's brethren, and there is little compelling evidence that Muslims, or even the Arabs among them, are now in coalescence. Their professions of allegiance remain in the sphere of sentiment. "This is the difference between us and our enemy," said Qaddhafi to an Islamic summit conference in Lahore. "Our enemy plans, decides and acts—whereas we meet, adopt resolutions, and then we forget about them."

The idea has gained ground that this sentiment for Muslim solidarity is indeed unusable in its natural form and must be nurtured and refined. The Saudis have increasingly seen Muslim solidarity in terms of gradual evolution; King Khalid has said that the movement

> has borne fruit and has proven its presence in the deliberations of the international organizations. All that we hope for is that these ties and relations among the Islamic countries will be strengthened, beginning with the economic relations which are the basis of the relations of countries with each other. . . . These countries must coordinate their economies so that they may not need others, and, rather, that the other may need them" (JPRS, 68331).

Klalid's expectations are restrained within proportion; he has no cause to underestimate the potential of Muslim solidarity.

Nevertheless, sentiments and statements are not without value in international diplomacy. Until recently, the Arabs were the most determined in their collection of resolutions, oaths, and sympathies from other Muslims. Their motives were identical to those of the Ottomans: they wished to project themselves as commanders of a wider constituency and so gain weight in the estimates of their friends and adversaries. They seek to speak not for 100 million Arabs but for 700 million Muslims. A PLO spokesman recently stated that European countries must realize now more than ever before the importance of the PLO in the Islamic world as well as the Arab (BBC/ME, February 22, 1979). Qaddhafi has spoken of the "thousands" of Muslims everywhere who wish to volunteer to serve Libya, because "everyone who believes in God, who is eager to protect the faith, who wishes to see that the faith is ultimately the victor, he wants to place himself at the disposal of the Jamahiriyya, Libya. He wants to volunteer to fight alongside Libya with weapons" (FBIS/ME, October 11, 1978). Then there are the remarks of Saudi Arabia's Prince Fahd: "The Islamic world could provide important backing to President Carter's efforts" toward a settlement of the West Bank and Jerusalem problems (IHT, March 21, 1979); the Saudis themselves, were they courted more assidiously, would apparently use their great influence among Muslims to assure that backing.

In each of these remarks is the implicit notion that the Muslim world is indeed wired for action and that the network could be triggered by one or a group of states. This is what Ryan saw in 1919; the claim was certainly a bluff then.

CONCLUSIONS

Among the legacies of Iran is a sense that anything is possible. Muslim political currents are now thought to be an undertow, ready to sweep away suddenly any unwary government or ruler.

Waves of revolution are not unprecedented in history. Europe in the mid-nineteenth century experienced such an upheaval, and traces are still with us in the guise of domino theories and the notion that revolutions travel in packs. However, Europe in 1848 shared so very much in the structure and organization of society, government, economic life, and historical consciousness; these led the continent as a whole to partake in turmoil. While Muslims share much—their own cultural heritage and the impact of the West—they do not yet share enough. The varieties of national, ethnic, and religious patterns, of societal strata, of governmental institutions, economic potential, self-awareness, and even literacy are many and distinct. Where some see variety others will see unity—as Iqbal did—but Iqbal portrayed the ideal; his "nation of Islam" was an inspired vision, not a reality.

There cannot then be one American *Islampolitik*. Political Islam within each polity responds to the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner unique. For years Khumayni preached that the United States was an enemy of Islam, and

yet we enjoy a "special relationship" with a Saudi Arabia that insists with conviction upon the integration of Islam and state. In some quarters of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the United States is still regarded as an ally. The Soviet Union faces the same dilemma of contradictions. Said Khumayni:

> The Soviet Union is playing an ambiguous role. On the one hand it is against the Islamic religion and against the freedom of the oppressed Islamic peoples. On the other hand, it pretends to be the advocate of these peoples. . . . [but] since it has forcibly subjected Islamic peoples to its domination, it does not have the right to represent itself as an opponent to exploitation and as a helper of the oppressed (FBIS/ME, November 20, 1978).

Contrast this view with Qaddhafi's, whose Libya is now the recipient of Soviet arms on a scale perhaps unprecedented among Moscow's past and present Middle Eastern allies. When asked whether he had not once denounced the "imperialism" and "atheism" of the Soviets, Qaddhafi laughed and replied:

> You have a good memory! That is true, but experience has shown us that the USSR is a sincere friend. It does not meddle in our internal affairs, and it fights alongside us against imperialism, colonial exploitation and racism, as well as in favor of freedom and peace. As for the religious question, it is a matter for the individual conscience and has nothing to do with humanity's great causes. There are millions of practicing Muslims in the USSR and probably as many atheists. But this does not influence Soviet policy on the course of world events (Le Monde, September 25-26, 1977).

As do the Soviets, we will have our Muslim friends and our Muslim foes; our policy must be tailored to each. However, our own experience and that of European powers is not without generalizing value, and these have left us some rough policy guidelines:

1. The United States cannot successfully depict itself as a "friend of Islam," and should not try. The Germans, Italians, French, British, and Russians each used this ploy at one time or another over the past century, with almost no success. There is nothing uniquely attractive about our society, our economic system, or our form of government from some abstract Islamic perspective. Our materialism is not preferable to that of "atheist communism"; our physical presence is no less abrasive than any other foreign presence. In the 1950s, Eisenhower toyed with the idea of an Islamic pact to be arrayed against the Soviet Union; the idea resurfaced in the 1960s, and on the eve of Iran's revolution was up for discussion once again. The concept has always earned as much Muslim contempt as support, and is open to easy ridicule. Our relations with Muslim states should continue to find justification in pragmatic terms of mutual interests; there is no room for the manipulation of Islam by non-Muslims for political ends. Miles Copeland relates this account of how the Central Intelligence Agency thought to build up a Pro-American leader in the 1950s: "Someone advanced the idea of promoting a 'Moslem Billy Graham' to mobilize religious fervor in a great move against Communism and actually got as far as selecting a wild-eyed Iraqi holy man to send on a tour of Arab countries. The project did no harm." The idea was primitive then, and would look both primitive and dangerous now.
2. We must show greater sensitivity to the needs of Muslim peoples to preserve some sense of self-worth under the shattering impact of modernity. In some countries this goal cannot be served by a large American presence; and if Americans cannot be convinced to show a modicum of consideration, to appreciate the wounds sustained by their hosts, then their flow might be controlled and our interests might be better managed from afar. Israeli authorities, whose citizens have now begun to flow into Egypt, are distributing to their nationals information advising appropriate conduct, dress, and speech. A similar step would not be out of order for a power with vital interests throughout this broad expanse. This is a question of awareness, of discipline, and of national image.
3. We must inform ourselves about self-avowedly Muslim opposition movements in the same measure that we keep tabs on other opposition movements. In many respects, Muslim movements are more elusive than other political groups organized along more conventional lines; for that reason alone, these movements warrant particular attention.

There is little else of a general nature to be done. We cannot aspire to arrest change, and we appear unprepared to intervene with conviction in the affairs of independent Muslim nations. While we cannot prevent the storms, perhaps we can provide for ourselves some shelter in changing weather.

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Political Islam

For perhaps the first time since the Ottoman *jihad* of over 60 years ago, Islam is once again a primary concern of great powers and their policymakers. From a negligible coincidence of human geography, Islam has been elevated by events in Iran to a political force of the first order. So rapid a reappraisal begs an exacting trial, notes Martin Kramer. Are we faced with one or several movements? Are other Muslim states liable to experience the same sort of turmoil as Iran? This essay examines the origins of Muslim self-assertion, the idea of an Islamic order, the role of Islam in some selected polities, and Muslim solidarity.

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